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Historians have generally accepted that the Peace of Westphalia (1648), which concluded 
the Thirty Years’ War (1618-48), was the moment when the concept of sovereign equality, a 
concept that recognizes that states have jurisdiction over their own territory and are all equal 
before international law, became an internationally recognized principle in diplomatic 
negotiations. However, recently, some scholars have begun to reevaluate this assumption, 
claiming that the Peace did not actually (formally or officially) establish the principle of 
sovereign equality throughout Europe. This reopening of a question long considered answered 
has proved fruitful and has encouraged this project’s exploration of both the Peace itself and of 
how subsequent politicians and diplomats actually deployed the Peace in their negotiations. This 
paper argues that, in international treaty negotiations, it may have mattered less to negotiators 
what the Peace actually said or what it formally established, than what negotiators argued it said 
and how they wielded it in their discussions. A close reading of the text of the Peace itself, as 
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well as of subsequent negotiations between the 17th and 20th centuries, reveals when and how 
diplomats wielded the Peace in their negotiations and to what effect.   
This project applies a close, contextual reading of the texts of treaties and the various 
interpretations of them over time. It looks for specific references to the Peace of Westphalia in 
later peace treaties, analyzes what diplomats meant when they invoked it, and considers whether 
the treaties themselves resulted in outcomes that were consistent with the intent of the 
negotiators. Finally, it considers whether or not the Peace exercised the influence on 
international relations that some past scholars have claimed. 
This project has three sections. First, it analyzes the context for the Peace of Westphalia 
including the wider debates circulating at the time that influenced negotiations. It reads the texts 
of the treaties that comprised the Peace and it considers the immediate interpretations associated 
with it. Second, it explores if and how it was invoked in subsequent peace treaties and 
organizations up to the United Nations Charter (1948). A careful examination of the texts and 
debates from the time frame indicates that diplomats and politicians invoked the Peace of 
Westphalia during negotiations that concluded the following wars: The War of Spanish 
Succession with its Treaty of Utrecht (1715), the War of Austrian Succession with its Treaty of 
Aix-la-Chapelle (1748), The Napoleonic Wars with the Congress of Vienna (1814), and World 
War I and the Treaty of Versailles (1919). This paper will also examine the United Nations 
Charter because it is the focus of several influential sources. Finally, it places this history in 
conversation with the current scholarly arguments about the importance of the Peace for 
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On May 23, 1618 the Thirty Years War began in the Holy Roman Empire.1 This war 
cumulated in the Congress of Westphalia which produced the Peace of Westphalia. The Peace 
was actually two treaties that were signed at two different times, locations, and between different 
rulers. The Peace has been identified as having established equally accountable states within an 
international community which allowed for the implementation of the concept of sovereign 
equality. Sovereign equality is the idea that recognizes that states have jurisdiction over their 
own territory and, therefore, are all equal in international law.  
The Peace of Westphalia undermined the Catholic Pope's religious authority by making 
allowances for and protecting Protestants. Before, the Papacy had exercised not only religious 
but territorial power (the Papal States). His authority also had reached into other states and their 
domestic affairs. Although papal influence had waned considerably since the Middle Ages, it 
was by no means inconsequential at the beginning of the seventeenth century. The Peace, 
however, undermined this secular power, and freed the states of Europe from the last significant 
remnants of Papal authority, which changed the international community and effectively created 
a new one. Because the universal reach of the Catholic Church had been definitively fractured 
territorial governments found themselves in a position to create new ways to navigate 
international affairs. The structure that the diplomats established in the treaties allowed for the 
concept of sovereign equality to take hold and, thus, all the individual governments embraced 
their right to rule over their own territory. The Westphalian treaties asserted a smaller scale of 
                                                 




this system within the Holy Roman Empire when they proclaimed that each Prince had the 
power to decide the religion for their region. 
First, this project analyzes the text of the Peace itself, texts that influenced its authors and 
the immediate interpretations associated with it. Although the term "sovereign equality" was not 
used, the writers use terms that asserted the principle. Several previous treaties influenced the 
contents of the Peace and gestured to some of the principles that Westphalia is associated with. 
These include the Peace of Augsburg (1555), Edict of Restitution (1629), and Peace of Prague 
(1635) all preceded the Peace of Westphalia and influenced the negotiations.  
Second, I explore if and how sovereign equality and the Peace of Westphalia was 
invoked in subsequent peace treaties and organizations up to the United Nations Charter (1948). 
By looking at the use of the Peace of Westphalia in later peace treaties, we can determine 
whether or not it had the effect on international relations that scholars claim it had. The 
Westphalian system was tested and developed throughout subsequent treaties and negotiations. 
This paper will thus evaluate the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748), 
Congress of Vienna (1814), Treaty of Versailles which included the Covenant of the League of 
Nations (1919), and United Nations Charter (1945). 
Finally, I place this history in conversation with subsequent scholarly arguments about 
the importance of the Peace for international relations. Exploring references to Westphalia in the 
international law itself and by authorities on international law reveal how subsequent students of 
the Peace conceptualized it. 
Many historians have proposed that the Peace of Westphalia was the moment when the 
concept of sovereign equality became internationally and legally recognized. More recently, 
scholars begun to reevaluate this claim and some have concluded the contrary: that the Peace did 
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not actually establish sovereign equality throughout Europe. However, given the frequency and 
intensity of references and debates over Westphalia, this suggests that whether or not the Peace 
deserves the attention it has received, it has proved over time to be "good to think with."2 This 
paper argues that for the politicians who negotiated future treaties it may not matter what the 
treaties actually said as much as what they imagined and used it.  
Treaties are, at the most basic level, an agreement between any number of countries or 
international organizations. This agreement can contain different articles and do different things. 
They are meant to resolve conflict but can result in more conflict. In this paper, a treaty fails if it 
does not resolve the conflict for any amount of time. For example, if a treaty is signed, then 
ignored and never enforced it has failed.  
Literature Review 
In the process of researching this paper I have uncovered a considerable body of sources 
(from subsequent treaties to scholarly debates) that refer to the Peace of Westphalia. Because of 
this unwieldly potential source base, not every single treaty could be examined for this project. 
Therefore, I have limited my analysis to what was referenced in several of the most important 
modern critical sources ("The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948" by Leo Gross and "The 
Westphalian Model and Sovereign Equality" by Peter Stirk). I have also limited the primary texts 
that I will consider. The source text of the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle 
(1748), Congress of Vienna (1814), and the Charter of the United Nations (1945) will not be 
examined.  
The principal text in this paper for studying the Peace of Westphalia (1648) is The 
Essential Thirty Years War by the historian Tryntje Helfferich. Helfferich covers both the history 
                                                 
2 Claude Levi-Strauss, Totemism, trans. Rodney Needham (Boston: Beacon, 1963), 89. 
7 
 
of the Thirty Years War itself as well as the Peace of Westphalia. Although the Peace was made 
up of two treaties, Helfferich only provides the complete translation of one. However, many of 
the articles are exactly the same in both treaty texts so only when the two differ does Helfferich 
explains the divergence or quotes directly from the text that differs. 
For the Treaty of Versailles (1919), this paper uses the copy provided in The Treaties of 
Peace, 1919-1923 by Lt. Col. Lawrence Martin. This work included the complete treaty within it 
as well as the Covenant of the League of Nations (1919). In addition to the primary text, this 
paper considers an analysis done by Sterling Edmunds of the relationship of the treaty to the law 
of nations in his book International Law and the Treaty of Peace. Edmunds published his severe 
critique of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. This means that he was writing while the treaty was 
being written and enforced. It is important to note that he was very biased against the treaty. This 
is reflected in his work. 
Several writers are used in this paper for their interpretation of a treaty, event, or concept. 
The Law of Nations (1758) by Emmerich de Vattel was an early comprehensive work that covers 
many aspects of international law in the generation after the Peace of Westphalia. Vattel was 
strongly influenced by Hugo Grotius's work.  
The book Three Centuries of Treaties of Peace and Their Teaching (1918) by Sir W. G. 
Phillimore offered several noteworthy comments on the international system. It is important to 
note that this work was published while the Treaty of Versailles was being discussed and World 
War I undoubtedly had a strong effect on his work.  
Sterling Edmunds3 examined the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. He did this by comparing 
the Treaty of Versailles side by side with the law of nations in his book, International Law and 
                                                 
3 Edmunds was an international law lecturer at St. Louis University. 
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the Treaty of Peace. He went through the text and break the Treaty of Versailles down article by 
article. He referenced Vattel's work on the law of nations for his analysis. 
The Foundations and Future of International Law (1941) by Tufts University professor 
P. H. Winfield is covered in this paper for his succinct and accessible writing and comments on 
the international system. It is important to note that he was writing almost thirty years after 
Phillimore and Edmunds during the buildup to World War II when Nazi Germany was beginning 
to invade. His work may be a response to several policies from that time, such as appeasement.  
Gerry Simpson published his critique of the United Nations Charter in 2000. His article, 
"The Great Powers, Sovereign Equality, and the Making of the United Nations Charter," 
showcased his biased against the Charter. He argued fervently that the United Nations is a 
hegemonic institution that invoked sovereign equality only to disregard it pragmatically. 
It should be noted that this paper is concerned with international relations exclusively 
within Europe. The author does not speak any language besides English and because of this some 
valuable sources may have been overlooked.  
History of the Language of International Law  
There are several terms that have evolved with the development of international relations 
that need to be defined. They include the law of nations, sovereign equality, the balance of power 
doctrine, the Concert of Europe, pragmatism, and international law. International relations have 
changed over time. This is reflected in the different terms that emerged. 
The law of nations is a system that Hugo Grotius greatly contributed to in his book On 
the Law of War and Peace in 1625. This system developed how states were to relate to each 
other. It regulated how states were supposed to act. This paper was not able to examine Grotius's 
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contributions in detail but he did influence Emmerich de Vattel, whose work this paper did 
examine more thoroughly.  
Sovereign equality, for the purposes of this paper, is the concept that recognizes that 
states have jurisdiction over their own territory and are all equal within the international system. 
It has been developed over time since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. It stated that the authority 
of the state was derived from the authority that the people under it gave up. While the author has 
been unable to determine exactly when this term was first used, it was claimed by Gerry 
Simpson that the United States State Department replaced 'equality of nations' with 'sovereign 
equality' during the negotiations prior to the drafting of the United Nations Charter.4   
The term international law was first used in 1789 by English philosopher Jeremy 
Bentham. P. H. Winfield offered a succinct close analysis of the role of a variety of principles 
international law in his book, The Foundations and Future of International Law (1941). His 
definition of international law stated that the treaty must establish general conduct and be 
between several parties.5 Winfield suggested that there should be three goals of international 
law: First, to remove laws which cause disputes between countries; second, if a dispute arises a 
tribunal should convene wherein the disagreeing countries can settle the dispute; and third that, if 
one of the countries does not submit to the tribunal or its decision, measures will be taken to 
prevent war.6  
The balance of power doctrine was developed by Friedrich von Gentz in 1806. The goal 
of the doctrine was to not allow a single state to become strong enough to overtake all or some of 
                                                 
4 Simpson, "The Great Powers, Sovereign Equality, and the Making of the United Nations Charter," 145. 
5 Winfield, The Foundations and Futures of International Law, 23. 
6 Winfield, The Foundations and Future of International Law, 101. 
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the powerful states. 7 The Congress of Vienna (1814) is credited with establishing this doctrine 
within European international relations. In the wake of the Napoleonic Wars, the Congress 
understood that it needed to keep France strong because it was one of the powers of Europe. As a 
power, France helped to keep other states in check and the international system functioning. 
Therefore, according to this doctrine, it needed to be preserved not dismantled (as Germany was 
in the Treaty of Versailles). The Congress of Vienna, with this doctrine, created the Concert of 
Europe. This is the term used to describe the relationships between the powers of Europe in the 
nineteenth century. This Concert was like a balancing act that failed when World War I broke 
out.  
Pragmatism, or realpolitik was another team that has evolved out of the international 
system. It is the concept that ideals are second to the reality of the situation.8 It is usually 
associated with Otto von Bismarck in the nineteenth century. 
According to P. H.  Winfield, international law itself had two ways of adding rules - first, 
if the rule was based on a custom that was generally observed by states, then it could become a 
law. Second, if the rule was set forth in a law-making treaty.9 This process was, in actuality, 
more complicated than it seemed. Although there are several criticisms of the custom route, they 
have no bearing on the second, treaty route, which concerns this paper. Winfield admits that "not 
all treaties are sources of law" because the prospective law in the treaty could oppose a law that 
was already in place.10 In order for a treaty to be law making, a majority of the states must be 
                                                 
7 Sir Walter G. F. Phillimore, Three Centuries of Treaties of Peace and Their Teaching (Boston: Little, Brown & 
Co, 1918), 4. 
8 For example, if during the Cold War the US President held a summit with China and Russia to discuss 
international politics, then the President would be putting aside their ideals about communism in favor of the reality 
that they need to talk with Russia and China because they are also world powers. 
9 Winfield, The Foundations and Future of International Law, 21. 
10 Winfield, The Foundations and Future of International Law, 23. 
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involved. Treaties are to be kept but can become null over time "when the circumstances in 
which it was made have essentially altered" or if all of the parties involved agree to change it.11  
Sovereign states are under international law. Winfield gives his definition of a sovereign 
state: "A state [that] is a political community the members of which are bound together by the tie 
of common subjection to some central authority which the bulk of them habitually obey; and that 
authority does not habitually obey anyone else."12 This sovereign state was not subject to any 
authority other than the one to which it has agreed. It "claims and actually possesses an absolute 
independence of all other" states.13 A partially sovereign state, which was one that has lost 
control over part of its territory, was still accountable to international law. The third and last kind 
of state that Winfield described was one that has been taken over by rebels in a coup, revolution, 
or any such instance where there was a change of government.14 Their sovereignty was 
compromised because they compromised another state's sovereignty and authority.15 
 
  
                                                 
11 Winfield, The Foundations and Future of International Law, 41. 
12 Winfield, The Foundations and Future of International Law, 25. 
13 Clarke, Thomas Brooke, An historical and political view of the disorganization of Europe, 1. 
14 This rebel state was still accountable to international law, but the rules change for them slightly - if they were 
affecting another country besides the one they were taking over, then the ruler of the other country had the right to 
go in and stop them. 
15 Winfield, The Foundations and Future of International Law, 25-26, 28. 
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1. THE ORIGIN OF SOVEREIGN EQUALITY 
1.1 The Thirty Years War 
The Thirty Years War began in 1618 as an "imperial civil war"16 within the Holy Roman 
Empire. The first part of the war originated in an internal struggle between the Holy Roman 
Emperor Ferdinand II and his opponents within the empire.17 However, several other European 
countries entered into the war, turning it into an international European war. By the time that the 
war had finally ended France, Sweden, and Denmark had all entered the fray. Several countries' 
leaders died over the course of the war, such as Ferdinand II of the Holy Roman Empire and the 
King of Sweden Gustavus Adolphus. By the end of the complicated and lengthy peace 
negotiations the belligerent countries, who had met in two different cities determined by their 
state religion, signed two separate treaties and ended the war. 
Before the war broke out, the Holy Roman Empire - modern day Germany18 and part of 
Eastern Europe - was ruled by the Habsburg family. The Empire had evolved out of the early 
Middle Ages as a composite monarchy, in which a relatively weak elective Emperor reigned 
over states of diverse sizes and political structures. By the 17th century the Habsburg family, 
whose power originated in Austrian and Hungarian lands on the easter frontier of the Empire, 
had ruled as emperors since the fifteenth century. The governmental hierarchy was organized in 
a loose and contentious federation of semi-autonomous states governed by diverse forms of 
government, with the imperial monarchy ruling over all of them.19 The system was organized in 
                                                 
16 Helfferich, The Essential Thirty Years War, xix.  
17 Helfferich, The Essential Thirty Years War, xv.  
18 Helfferich, The Essential Thirty Years War, ix. 
19 Helfferich, The Essential Thirty Years War, x. 
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a very complicated way and is difficult to describe in full. Below is a diagram designed by Peter 
Wilson in his book The Thirty Years War: A Sourcebook.20 
 
Figure 1.1: The Holy Roman Empire's Political System, pre-Thirty Years War 
From Figure 1.1, it is apparent that the system was very complex. For this paper, the author only 
generally speaks of this system but will refer to the Emperor, Imperial Diet, princes, and the 
electors.  
The issues that contributed to the Thirty Years war had already cause rebellion to erupt in 
the recent past. After each struggle, imperial regents negotiated peace and wrote treaties. One of 
the most important treaties - the Peace of Augsburg in 1555 - tried to end the religious struggle 
by giving the Lutheran Princes full legal status. It confirmed and expanded a previous treaty - the 
                                                 
20 Peter Wilson, The Thirty Years War: A Sourcebook, (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) xxix. 
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Treaty of Passau from 1552 - and established the principle cuius regio, eius relgio, or whose 
reign, his religion. In practice, each prince could pick for his territory what religion subjects 
would follow, either Catholicism or Lutheranism.21 While the Peace of Augsburg was successful 
for a time, it was explicitly intended to be temporary22 and two major problems soon arose. First, 
this treaty only gave protections to Lutherans and did not recognize the smaller Protestant sects 
that emerged after 1555 (e.g., Calvinists). Second, the Protestant population had continued to 
seize Catholic church property even after the treaties prevented them from doing this. When the 
Emperor had attempted to return some of the stolen property back to the Catholic church, the 
Protestant population saw this as an "act of war" and a violation of their rights.23 The civil war 
that erupted again in 1618 turned into the Thirty Years War. The grievances included the control 
of property (especially religious property), territory, religious liberty and power, and the 
structure of the Holy Roman Empire.  
War broke out when tensions over these issues between the Emperor, the Princes, and the 
local estates boiled over. The local estates claimed that they had the right to veto central taxes, 
oversee their regional government, negotiate with external entities, appeal to the King directly, 
declare the religion of their territory, and to fire the Princes. They pressed hard to take power and 
authority from the centralized part of the government for themselves.24 This pressure and the 
grievances of the local estates were further complicated and compounded by religious tension. 
The war began with the Defenestration of Prague on May 23, 1618.25 A large number of 
                                                 
21 The Religious Peace of Augsburg (September 25, 1555), in Experiencing the Thirty Years War, A Brief History 
with Documents, ed. by Hans Medick and Benjamin Marschke (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2013), 46. 
22 The Religious Peace of Augsburg (September 25, 1555). Experiencing the Thirty Years War, A Brief History with 
Documents, 45, 48. 
23 Helfferich, The Essential Thirty Years War, xii.  
24 Helfferich, The Essential Thirty Years War, x. 
25 Wilhelm Count von Slavata, The Defenestration of Prague (May 23, 1618), Experiencing the Thirty Years War, A 
Brief History with Documents, eds. Hans Medick and Benjamin Marschke (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2013), 36.  
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Protestants had gathered in Prague "to protest new imperial policies that violated their religious 
rights as Protestants, as well as their political rights as estates."26 When the imperial regents and 
the leaders of the Estates gathered to talk about what was happening, the men stormed their 
meeting place and threw the two regents and the secretary out of the window,27 apparently while 
screaming: "Now we will deal with our religious enemies appropriately!"28 Both escaped, what 
thereafter was called the "Defenestration of Prague," with their lives, probably due to their heavy 
coats and the incline of the wall that caused them to slide down instead of plumet.29 By the time 
the war started, barely a hundred years had passed since Luther had nailed his theses to the door 
and sparked the Reformation. Some of the Princes had already declared themselves Protestant 
instead of Catholic, which was what religion the Emperor ascribed to and what defined the 
Empire as "Holy."  
These issues proved "fully interrelated" to international politics. Denmark, Sweden, 
Spain, and France ultimately became major players in the war, entering for territorial and/or 
religious reasons. Catholic ruled Spain, being part of the Habsburg Empire, was involved early 
on in the war and started providing the Holy Roman Empire assistance in 1619.30 Protestant 
ruled Denmark entered into the war later in 1625, which "restart[ed] the war."31 Sweden became 
involved on the Protestant side five years later and France joined the Catholics five years after 
Sweden.32 With all these countries and their own political and financial aims in the mix, it is not 
                                                 
26 Wilhelm, The Defenestration of Prague (May 23, 1618), Experiencing the Thirty Years War, A Brief History with 
Documents, 36. 
27 Helfferich, The Essential Thirty Years War, 11. 
28 Wilhelm, The Defenestration of Prague (May 23, 1618), Experiencing the Thirty Years War, A Brief History with 
Documents, 38. 
29 Wilhelm, The Defenestration of Prague (May 23, 1618), Experiencing the Thirty Years War, A Brief History with 
Documents, 37. 
30 Wilson, The Thirty Years War, xix.  
31 Wilson, The Thirty Years War, xix.  
32 Wilson, The Thirty Years War, 303. 
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hard to grasp why the war carried on for so long and was so destructive. The mounting death toll 
was undoubtably a source of pressure for negotiators. Later, at the Congress of Vienna (1814) 
when the balance of power doctrine was enacted, this treaty was cited because there were so 
many political interests involved and the treaty "made the absolute dominion of the [Holy 
Roman] Emperor over the whole of Germany impossible."33 The treaty laid the foundation for 
this doctrine, although the Congress of Vienna is credited with establishing it firmly, because it 
made peace between the Protestants and Catholics. "There is little doubt that notions of the 
balance of power did become more prominent in Europe after 1648."34 In order that one might 
not gain an advantage over the other, a balance needed to be struck.  
The Edict of Restitution was issued on March 6, 1629 during the Thirty Years War by 
Emperor Ferdinand II. At this point in the war, Catholic France had not yet joined the Protestant 
side and the Catholics were clearly winning "after a decade of uninterrupted military victories, 
and the edict signaled the victor's plans for a post war settlement."35 To Catholic advisors, this 
edict was a way of bringing "Protestant souls to the old faith" by restoring the lands they had 
taken back during the Peace of Augsburg.36 Protestant "contemporaries saw its legalized seizure 
of Protestant lands and outright intolerance of Calvinism as highly aggressive."37 While the Edict 
was meant to signal the end of the war it did the opposite. The Protestant population was upset 
and fearful of what the Emperor would do with the power he was winning through the war and 
"most Catholic leaders, apart from the militant Jesuits, found the edict to be overreaching and 
                                                 
33 Phillimore, Three Centuries of Treaties of Peace and Their Teaching, 19. 
34 Andrew C. Thompson, War and Religion After Westphalia, 1648-1713, ed. David Onnekink (Vermont: Ashgate 
Publishing Co., 2009), 52. 
35 The Religious Peace of Augsburg (September 25, 1555), Experiencing the Thirty Years War, A Brief History with 
Documents, 48.  
36 The Religious Peace of Augsburg (September 25, 1555), Experiencing the Thirty Years War, A Brief History with 
Documents, 48. 
37 The Edict of Restitution (March 6, 1629), Experiencing the Thirty Years War, A Brief History with Documents, 
eds. Hans Medick and Benjamin Marschke (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2013), 49. 
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unrealistic, and they anticipated that it would prolong the war by hardening Protestant 
resistance."38 The edict was not applied to all of the affected properties or in the same way across 
those that were affected. So, war continued. 
The Peace of Prague, issued on May 30, 1635, shifted the alliances while France was 
gathering strength to intervene in the war. This Peace was between Emperor Ferdinand II and 
Elector Johann Georg I, Duke of Saxony who was a Protestant leader in the Holy Roman 
Empire. It was put together in the wake of two important events: The Catholic win at the Battle 
of Nördlingen in 1634 and France entering the war in late 1635.39 France, though Catholic, 
actually entered the war on the Protestant side because dividing Germany was the best decision 
for the security of the country.40 The intention behind the Edict of Restitution (1629) was to take 
a first step toward ending the war by persuading Protestant states to return to the Empire. The 
Emperor withdrew the Edict because it was causing disagreement. The Emperor promised 
amnesty to the princes and leaders who rebelled if they would surrender. The Elector of Saxony 
received "territorial concessions" for surrendering and a few Protestant princes followed his lead, 
all while the war continued.41  
However, the Emperor could not offer amnesty to all of the princes because he had given 
away some of their land already as spoils for his allies and because of this the treaty failed to 
give the princes enough incentive to surrender and establish a general peace. The Peace of 
Prague "only hardened [the Protestant's] stance against him and reaffirmed their alliance with 
Sweden."42 It marked a turning point in the war - as the Protestant leaders were reaffirming their 
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alliance with Sweden, Swedish troops that had been busy with an unrelated conflict were freed 
up and were able to come and contribute to the war effort. "Sweden's subsequent victory at the 
Battle of Wittstock in 1636 broke the momentum of the Catholic imperial side, and the war 
would continue on for more than a decade."43 Now, the imperial Catholics were not winning 
battles as before. The Peace of Prague marked the beginning of a new phase rather than signaling 
the end of the war.44 
Ending the war took many more years, beginning with the Hamburg Peace Preliminaries 
in 1641. The warring parties agreed to meet to begin drawing up the treaties.45 Hamburg was 
chosen because it was a financial center that was considered neutral by all the countries. While 
the agreement that resulted from these meetings determined the form of the ensuing Congress 
that met in Münster and Osnabrück in 1644 it did not determine the contents of the treaties.46 
The Treaty of Münster was signed first on May 15, 1648 and the Treaty of Osnabrück which 
officially concluded the war was signed on October 24, 1648. 
1.2 The Peace of Westphalia 
1.2.1 Historical and Political Overview 
The product of the four-year Congress of Westphalia, the Peace of Westphalia was 
actually two treaties that, together, form the complete agreement between the Holy Roman 
Empire and the rest of the European powers. According to the historian Tryntje Helfferich, the 
negotiators "introduced the modern conference, or congress, system of diplomacy...and laid the 
foundation for the modern European system of states."47 The Congress of Westphalia took so 
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long to draft the Peace because the Holy Roman Empire was trying to maintain the structure of 
electors, princes, and imperial cities within the composite sovereignty system. He hoped to 
protect the structure of his kingdom and his power, an issue over which the war started was 
because the territorial estates wanted to "cut out the middleman" and go to the Emperor 
themselves instead of going through the princes. The princes did not want to lose power that they 
had acquired during the war and the constant military developments made negotiations difficult 
as each party kept holding out for a clear victory.48 Helfferich concluded that “no one could 
claim a decisive victory and the war ended out of sheer exhaustion.”49 The two treaties were 
composed and signed a little over 35 miles away from each other in the cities of Münster and 
Osanbrück. While they have some very similar - even identical - clauses, there are some 
elements that are slightly different or are absent from the other treaty.  
The Peace of Westphalia was a “religious, political, and territorial compromise.”50 Just as 
religion played such a large role in the Thirty Years War, it also played a large role in the 
structure of the peace negotiations and the accepted clauses. Catholic France and its allies were 
negotiating from Münster while Protestant Sweden and its allies were stationed in Osnabrück. 
This alignment meant that the Catholics and the Protestants, respectively, were each separately 
negotiating with the Holy Roman Empire, seeming to reinforce an assumption that religion 
played a large role in the war, and continued to do so. France, reportedly, did not want to make 
any concessions that would undermine the authority of Catholicism.51 Another reason that the 
belligerents may have conducted two separate negotiations was because they saw these conflicts 
as two separate wars waged separately over different time frames; the Holy Roman Empire 
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against the Swedish in 1630 and another against the French, which began in 1635.52 This would 
make sense because, yet a different concurrent war, the Eighty Years War, was settled during the 
negotiations at Münster, which this paper examines later. All of these strategies suggest a strong 
religious component to the war and structure of the negotiations.  
The Peace "resolved religious conflicts that had been so intertwined with all the other 
issues driving the war" by "remov[ing] the right of the princes to set the religion of the 
territories."53 However, this provision did not remove their right to "regulate [their] established 
territorial religions."54 The Peace was certainly ambitious and, by taking away the right of 
princes to establish the religion of their provinces, the Peace allowed for multiple religions 
within a region instead of just the one set by the ruling prince. Whether or not it truly ended all 
religious wars is debated, however, it did decisively break the cycle of religious wars that Europe 
was in at the time.55 The Peace mitigated the tensions within Christianity. There was a definite 
change in the role of religion in politics after the Peace was signed.   
Even as it was being drafted, the Peace of Westphalia also aimed at resolving conflict 
outside the scope of the Thirty Years War. It should be noted that almost every major European 
power at the time was involved with at least one of the treaties.56 The Spanish-Dutch War (1568-
1648) and the Franco-Spanish War (1635-1659) were both being waged at the same time and a 
part of the peace negotiations. The Holy Roman Empire and Spain had both been part of the 
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Habsburg Empire and ruled under Charles V. When Charles V abdicated, he did not leave an heir 
and his kingdom was divided up, but the old political and religious affinities still existed.57 Thus, 
Emperor Ferdinand III of the Holy Roman Empire was naturally inclined to support his dynastic 
kin, the King of Spain Philip IV, in his war against the French. "Peace in the Empire came when 
Emperor Ferdinand III finally granted French demands and promised not to support Spain in the 
ongoing Franco-Spanish conflict" in the Treaty at Münster.58 The Spanish-Dutch conflict was 
resolved within the Congress of Westphalia and the Treaty at Münster. The Franco-Spanish 
conflict was not resolved until later with the Peace of the Pyrenees (1659).59  
The Peace of Westphalia also changed the political structure of the Holy Roman Empire. 
It arranged “for an equal number of Protestant and Catholic deputies to be seated at imperial 
diets."60 This division was important as it ensured Protestant representation in this important 
political body and, thus, it ensured that there was change in the political structure and debates of 
the Holy Roman Empire.  
The terms of the Peace meant that the Empire was no longer "Holy" because its princes 
and populations were no longer all (or even a majority) Catholic. The Empire had was now more 
diverse where it had previously been unified before the Reformation. Voltaire commented that 
"this agglomeration which was called and which still calls itself the Holy Roman Empire was 
neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire."61 The protections that were afforded to Protestants 
changed the government's view of itself and simultaneously diluted and disregarded the authority 
of the office it had previously been subject to - the Catholic Pope. The negotiators “agreed to 
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ignore any formal protests that the papacy might lodge to the exchange of territories envisioned 
by the settlement.”62 The Pope did, in fact, protest the Peace because it made concessions to the 
Protestants. His issued the Bull Zel Domus in November of 1648. The diplomats anticipated this 
and decided to uphold the treaty instead of the power of the Catholic church. This event is 
considered to be "evidence of a papal withdrawal form European diplomacy." 63All these 
changes ensured that a new political system was created to accommodate the new religions that 
were developing.  
1.2.2 Treaty Contents 
The treaty at Osnabrück is named Instrumentum Pacis Osnabrugensis (IPO) and the 
treaty signed at Münster is named the Instrumentum Pacis Monsterieusis (IPM).64 While the 
majority of each of the treaties corresponds with each other and many of the clauses are 
identical, there are still several differences concerning territories that exchanged and conceded. 
The chosen principal text with the treaties, The Essential Thirty Years War by Tryntje Helfferich, 
translates and copies comprehensively only the IPO. When a clause differs, Helfferich either 
notes that the clause in the IPO was not in the IPM or provides the excerpt of the clause that was 
in the IPM and not the IPO at the end of the chapter. Therefore, the IPO will be the one that is 
primarily considered. 
Both treaties begin with the usual praises of all the ruling parties involved. This formed 
the obligatory acknowledgements found in most treaties during this time period. Ferdinand II and 
III of the Holy Roman Empire, Gustavus Adolphus and Lady Christina of Sweden, Philip of 
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Spain, and Louis XIV of France are all mentioned, and their full titles given. Having concluded 
the recitation all of the individual monarch's titles, the treaties move on to talk about amnesty. 
The Article II dealt with the specifics of granting amnesty to those involved in the war. 
The goal of this clause seems to be to grant as many people amnesty as possible so that 
resentments over the past war could not be used to incite future conflict. The negotiators offer a 
"perpetual oblivion and amnesty" for the constituents.65 The next article of note is Article IV 
which dealt with the establishment and passing of a specific territory.66 Important to note from 
this article is that the amnesty was further underlined in Section Fifty-one, where it stated that 
there should be no prejudice towards any of the soldiers, officers, their families, or anyone else 
involved with the war.67 
Article V dealt with reconciling the politics before the war with the new political system 
that was emerging. Section One talks about the treaties that were agreed upon before the war 
began. Several treaties were confirmed as still valid: The Treaty of Passau (1552) and the 
Religious Peace (1555) which was confirmed in 1566 at Augsburg, otherwise known as the 
Peace of Augsburg.68 The Peace of Passau was between Emperor Charles V and the Protestant 
leaders. Charles V lost the war against the Protestants and was forced to give them protections 
that he had previously resisted granting. This eventually grew into the Religious Peace or Peace 
of Augsburg.69 As stated earlier, the Peace of Augsburg attempted to smooth the rising tensions 
but ultimately failed and contributed to the Protestant rebellion against the Emperor. It attempted 
to protect subjects that ascribed to a different religion than the ruler of their territory by allowing 
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them the right to emigrate from their territory to another. 70 The Peace of Westphalia took this 
further in Section Thirty by forbidding territorial rulers from coercing their subject to join their 
religion. Section Two in Article V was concerned with resetting the political structure and 
territories to whoever owned them as of January 1, 1624. The list of returned territory included 
the cities of Augsburg, Dinkelsbühl, Biberach, and Ravensburg.71 After setting up a new 
government in Augsburg, Section Fourteen redistributed certain religious properties (e.g., church 
grounds) to whoever occupied them on the aforementioned date. If the property was not 
mentioned, then the current owners would retain the property. Section Fifteen states that if 
anyone of religious authority (e.g., an archbishop, bishop, etc.) were to change religions then 
they should be allowed to do so peacefully and honorably so long as they surrender "their rights, 
property and income" to the church they are leaving for the next person appointed. Section 
Forty-one was a clause that outlines the general purpose of the Peace well:  
And since all the efforts that have been made to negotiate a greater freedom of 
 religious exercise in the above-mentioned lands, as well as in the rest of the kingdoms 
 and provinces of [the Holy Roman Emperor], have come to naught due to the opposition 
 of the imperial plenipotentiaries, Her Royal Majesty of Sweden and the estates of the 
 Augsburg Confession reserve for themselves the right to intervene amicably and 
 intercede humbly with His Imperial Majesty at the next diet or elsewhere; yet the peace 
 shall always endure and all violence and hostility shall be prevented.72 
 
While the Peace extended the previously given rights to other religions besides Catholicism, it 
did not go as far as the Protestant leadership in Sweden wanted it to, as evidenced in the quote 
above. The Queen wanted to be able to ensure that the Holy Roman Emperor would enforce the 
rights that the Protestants were fighting for. The focus of the negotiations, however, remained on 
peace and feasible resolutions to discontent later on. Section Fifty-one dealt with distributing 
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votes at the imperial diets accordingly. The Peace dictates that number of representatives for 
Catholics and Protestants are to be equal. No matter the level of meeting or the amount of people 
both religions were to be represented equally, except when the matter concerns a dispute that 
only concerns one of the religions. Section Fifty-two prohibits matters being decided by a 
majority vote, which makes sense because in a dispute everyone would probably vote according 
to their religion and the previous section dictates that each religion should make up half the 
representatives. Therefore, a majority vote would accomplish nothing. Instead, the section 
encourages "amicable agreement."73  
In Article VI, the Congress established the nation of Switzerland. Article VII addressed 
the Calvinist population, which was something that the Peace of Augsburg had failed to do.74 
The Congress states in Section One that they are focused on "preserving everyone's freedom of 
conscience."75 The leader of a province could change the official religion to whatever he wanted 
but he could not enforce it on his population nor discriminate against other religions. While it 
was, "his region, his religion," this protects the Prince of the province from the Emperor. 
Protestant governments, such as Sweden, also wanted to protect Protestants within provinces that 
had a Catholic prince. Thus, this and the next section are included to afford them that protection. 
Section Two protects the community and gives them the right to embrace a different religion, 
such as Calvinism which was in the minority.  
The Congress of Westphalia addressed the Holy Roman Empire's imperial estates in 
Article VIII. In Section One they set a strong precedent protecting the rights of the people in the 
Holy Roman Empire: 
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  In order to ensure, however, that no future disputes arise over the state of politics, each 
 and every elector, prince, and estate of the [Holy] Roman Empire shall, by virtue of the 
 present treaty, be established and confirmed in, and enjoy possession of, all their ancient 
 rights, prerogatives, liberties, privileges, dominions, regalia, and free exercise of their 
 territorial rights in both ecclesiastical and political affairs, so that, in fact, they neither can 
 nor shall be molested by anyone at any time, for any pretext whatsoever.76 
 
This section does two things at once. First, it protects the elaborate political system that the Holy 
Roman Empire employed before the war which was one of the grievances against the Empire 
that contributed to the war. Second, it protects not only the elector's authority but the rights of the 
Princes of the territorial estates in the Empire in political and religious (ecclesiastical) issues. 
This section made the Holy Roman Emperor an arbiter between the estates. In Section Two the 
rights are more clearly outlined. The estates can bring their grievances and criticisms to the 
"deliberations about the affairs of the empire, especially in the consideration or interpretation of 
laws, the declaration of war, the imposition of taxes,...the quartering of soldiers, the raising of 
new fortifications within the sovereign territory of the estates" as well as make alliances directly 
with other countries.77 This section makes it clear that while the princes and electors are still in 
charge, the territorial estates now have the right to advocate for themselves in new ways, 
including alliances. The ability to make alliances may have been crucial for Protestant estates 
because it allowed them to directly open a dialogue with other Protestant countries - such as 
Sweden - to protect themselves even more. 
Article X dealt with payments to Sweden for them returning occupied territory to the 
Empire. Article XI outlines the elector of Brandenburg's - Frederick William - territory and 
payment. The next article that Helfferich included was Article XVI Section Eight that disbanded 
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the Swedish army and required that certain estates in the Holy Roman Empire pay a sum to 
contribute to the disbanding of their army. This concludes the treaty in full. 
1.3 Early Interpretations 
The Peace of Westphalia is considered to have marked a turning point in European 
history. For example, historians Hans Medick and Benjamin Marschke proclaimed it a 
"watershed in the political development of Germany and the balance of European great power 
politics, but also as the establishment of a system of norms and a legal understanding of 
European international relations that would endure for centuries."78 This new understanding not 
only underpinned the beginnings of "balance of power" politics, but it also contributed to the 
debate about how to understand of the character and development of nations.  
The political and academic implications of the Peace of Westphalia focused considerable 
scholarly attention almost immediately. Three major early-modern scholars - Emmerich de 
Vattel and Hugo Grotius - recognized the importance of the Peace to the development of, what 
was called at the time, the "law of nations." While these scholars did not explicitly use the phrase 
"sovereign equality," its meaning was integral to the law of nations.  
They linked what they argued were the rights of men to the rights of nations. They argued 
that the power of any government comes from each individual man giving up a portion of his 
own power and independence to submit to said government. While the law of nations developed 
from different principles or implicated different maxims for each of these three men, they all 
arrived at the same understanding of what the law should entail. 
De jure belli ac pacis (On the Law of War and Peace), was written by Hugo Grotius - a 
Dutch philosopher who lived from 1583 to 1645 - was influential in establishing international 
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law as we know it.79 “By many accounts, he was the first thinker to articulate a concept of a law 
that” bound states.80 Grotius' influence was the result of how he addressed a relevant topic in a 
unique way by adapting "the older ideas to new conditions; thus, the idea that international 
society was organized on a feudal basis was wiped out in the century of the Reformation."81 He 
argued that the law of nations “was the basis for society and this the ultimate origin of law...was 
through [men’s] consent.”82 His work was one of the first to discuss the law of nations and he 
greatly influenced Emmerich de Vattel’s work on the topic. While this paper cannot discuss 
Grotius at length, he is worth mentioning as the father of international law. 
In his extensive work The Law of Nations or Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to 
the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns: A Work Tending to Display the True Interest 
of Powers (1758), Vattel outlined the law of nations and its development very clearly. Vattel was 
a student and upholder of Grotius and, therefore, many of his views were similar to those of 
Grotius.83 It is important to note that Vattel's work was completed in 1758, 110 years after the 
Peace of Westphalia. But this work was still in close enough to examine its immediate aftermath 
with authority. In order to outline this law this effectively, relevant terms must be defined. The 
definition of a nation was a "body politic, or a society of men united together to promote their 
mutual safety and advantage by means of their union."84 Vattel also explores how and why men 
come together to form societies; while he thinks men are inherently selfish and motivated by 
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their own self-preservation, he believes that men are also incapable of preserving their own 
rights and must form societies to better protect themselves.85 In addition to being a united body 
of individuals, "every nation that governs itself, under what form soever, without any 
dependence on foreign power, is a sovereign state."86 Here, Vattel was defining what a sovereign 
government looks like, which will support his discussion of the equality between sovereign 
governments. Vattel's definition of treaty is also important to look at. A treaty was "a pact made 
with a view to the public welfare by the superior power, either for perpetuity, or for a 
considerable time."87 Vattel defined a number of terms for the diplomats and government 
officers of his time.  
Vattel defined the law of nations as "the science of the law subsisting between nations 
and states, and of the obligations that flow from it."88 The law stems from the rights that each 
man individually possesses that he gives over to the state that rules him, granting them the 
authority to act on his behalf: 
 Since men are naturally equal, and their rights and obligations are the same, as equally 
 proceeding from nature, nations composed of men, considered as so many free persons 
 living together in the state of nature, are naturally equal, and receive from nature the 
 same obligations and rights.89 
 
Because all men are equal and all nations are made of men, all nations are, therefore, equal to 
each other. He further underscored this point by concluding that the "necessary consequence of 
this equality" was that what was allowed or forbidden for one country was allowed or forbidden 
for the rest. He went further and stated that "Nations being free, independent, and equal, and 
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having a right to judge according to the dictates of conscience...the effect of all this is...a perfect 
equality of rights between nations, in the administration of their affairs."90 This is the definition 
of sovereign equality, even though Vattel did not expressly name it. 
The law of nations had application to relationships between the state and religion as well. 
This relationship was debated throughout the Peace of Westphalia and Vattel addressed it as 
well. He claimed that there should not be any religious wars because "what right have men to 
proclaim themselves the defenders and protectors of the cause of God?"91 Therefore, countries 
should not go to war over religion but convict people with different methods, such as sending out 
missionaries.92 He continued detailing the rights of countries that would want to intercede when 
there was religious persecution in another country. "When a religion is prosecuted in one 
country, the foreign nations who profess it may intercede diplomatically through non-violent 
means for their brethren" but that is all they can do until the persecution reaches an "intolerable 
excess," thereby transforming the issue from religious persecution to an act of tyranny.93 Only 
then can a country directly interfere and stop the government of another country. The phrase 
"intolerable excess" is inherently vague and Vattel does not define it any further. The 
interpretation of this phrase would be left to the victor of the war. 
Vattel then turned his attention to the role of the Catholic Pope in international law and 
society. He argued passionately that the Pope's role was destructive and that there were 
"enormous abuses the popes have formerly introduced by their authority" and found that the 
Pope's actions and authority are inconsistent with the law of nations.94 One of the examples 
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Vattel specifically utilized to support this point was the Peace of Westphalia because the Pope at 
the time95 was very displeased about some of the articles in the treaties. The Pope "published a 
bull, in which, from his own certain knowledge, and full ecclesiastical power, he declared several 
articles in the treaty null...and that nobody was bound to observe them." The Pope takes on "the 
tone of an absolute master" and "sap[s] the foundations of [the countries'] tranquility. 96 This 
critique of the Pope is critical because it shows the ending of the previous system and the 
beginning of the new one that we rely on today. Before the change, the Pope's authority was 
much stronger, and he had the power to settle matters between European states. When the 
Reformation happened, several countries refused to be subject to the Pope's secular authority, as 
well as princes and villagers within Catholic states like the Holy Roman Empire. A system based 
on sovereign equality is what replaced the Pope.  
Echoing Grotius and Vattel, P. H. Winfield observed that in some circumstances the 
sovereignty of another state might be violated by other states. For example, such acts included 
humanitarian crises (genocide, persecution, oppression) or if they attacked another sovereign 
state unjustly. As Vattel had argued, while all of the states together did not have "any authority 
over the conduct of any one"97 other country, intervention was allowed under certain 
circumstances. This helped to distribute power evenly and keep all of the states in check. There 
were three ways an outside state could intervene in another one, according to Winfield. Internal 
intervention was when State A interfered between conflicting entities within State B. When State 
A interfered with relations between State B and State C, they used external intervention. Lastly, 
punitive intervention was when State A attacked State B and State B responds in any way that is 
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not a declaration of war (a blockade or embargo).98 The law of nations requires states to 
"preserve itself...and its members." 99 Independence and sovereign equality are essential for a 
state to do its duty to the people that give it authority. Any nation that interferes with another's 
duty was infringing on their rights.  
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2. THE LEGACY OF THE PEACE OF WESTPHALIA 
2.1 The Treaty of Utrecht 
The Treaty of Utrecht resolved the Spanish War of Succession, which had gone on for 12 
years from 1702 until April 11, 1713.100 The war was between France, with Spain, and the 
"Great Alliance," which included Great Britain, Holy Roman Empire, the Dutch Republic, and 
Prussia. While the treaty "brought about a prolonged period of peace in Europe, it also 
inaugurated the age of aggressive 'balance of power' politics."101 The treaty resolved tensions 
until the War of the Austrian Succession in 1740. One of its more striking features is that it did 
not discuss religious matters. This supports the claims that the Peace of Westphalia ended the 
cycle of religious wars in Europe. While the treaty itself does not invoke or discuss religion, the 
"plenipotentiaries submitted a declaration of support for suppressed religious minorities" on the 
same date as the treaty was signed.102 The negotiations introduced, what scholars now call, the 
concept of "performing" diplomacy, wherein the diplomats would make a big show, feast, and 
uphold traditions in public negotiations but the real negotiating would happen informally behind 
closed doors.103  
The war began because the Spanish throne was empty. The French monarch, Louis XIV 
wanted to place his grandson and heir, Philip V, on the Spanish throne so that, one day, the two 
thrones would be ruled by the same person. Spain accepted his nomination because he was of 
Spanish blood. The Peace of the Pyrenees (1659), from earlier in this paper, required that Louis 
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XIV marry a Spanish princess to help the countries made amends.104 The Great Alliance saw this 
as a consolidation of power between the Spanish and French thrones105 and did not want that to 
happen as France would become too powerful and potentially upset the balance of power by 
becoming a universal monarch, like the Habsburgs. The Peace of Westphalia had established the 
foundation for this phase of European politics wherein the "balance of European great power" 
must be kept.106 The belligerents saw the wars as a "struggle of domination for the continent."107 
Despite the rest of the European leaders’ wariness of French motives, the Spanish government 
had worked out a deal with the French and wanted Philip V to succeed to the throne.108  
The war mainly originated because of issues within the European continent but its reach 
and influence went beyond that. The treaty was one of the first to involve the colonial trade and 
the Atlantic Exchange. The colonies, primarily those in the Americas, played an important role 
in and contributed to the war. The European colonizing countries were all trying to increase their 
own commerce and power in the Atlantic. The colonies played such a large role because they 
were generating a lot of money for their colonizer. While Spain only provided six percent of the 
goods coming to Europe, their armada protected and maintained the trade, which made control of 
the Spanish throne very important.109 Trade played such a role that merchants were called as 
experts to the negotiations with diplomats.110 Historian Lucien Bély observed that "for English 
and Dutch merchants, as well as for their governments, the main danger with a French prince as 
the king of Spain was the benefits that the French economy could reap, especially through direct 
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access to the wealth of Spanish America."111 This danger was very real for Great Britain and the 
Dutch Republic but the Spanish government did not give into France easily. The Spanish did 
want Philip V to rule but they also "maintained the uniqueness of [their] system and defended 
[their] independence."112  
The importance of the Treaty of Utrecht should not be underrated, as it had been by 
current scholars. This treaty had often been "ignored in international relations textbooks or 
downgraded." 113 This treaty was usually commemorated and remembered less than the Peace of 
Westphalia. While how much a treaty is commemorated is usually indicative of its importance, 
some scholars argue that the Treaty of Utrecht "superseded Westphalia" and "that where the 
Peace of Westphalia failed to achieve stability in Europe, the Peace of Utrecht [succeeded] in 
creating a functional alliance system." This more functional alliance system developed from 
sovereign equality. Under this concept, all states are considered equal before the law, but they 
are not all equal in power. Because some states are weaker than others, the stronger often take on 
the responsibility of protecting the weaker. 
Most of the countries involved came out of the war with very little or no success. The 
Dutch did not come out with anything to show for their involvement and neither did the English. 
The French won the war and Philip V became the next king of Spain, but he had to give up his 
right to the French throne. The French also lost part of Canada and Newfoundland which had 
harsh consequences. Spain lost some of its power in Europe and in the Americas.114 Only the 
king of Prussia was satisfied with how the war ended.115  
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Sovereign equality was discussed in several different ways in this Treaty. The war itself 
involved multiple countries interfering with another country's succession crisis. These countries 
should not have intervened, according to sovereign equality and the law of nations. The only 
instance where it was acceptable to invade another country was if there was an “intolerable 
excess” of persecution happening, as Vattel described. 116 However, under the balance of power 
doctrine, these States felt compelled to intervene.  During the war, the French asked for the Pope 
to come in and resolve the issue. The Pope declined to do so and called the proposal absurd.117 
The Treaty did secure a balance and made it law that the French and Spanish throne could never 
be held by the same person in order to maintain that balance. The Treaty did not directly invoke 
the Peace of Westphalia, but sovereignty undoubtedly played a large role in this war and its 
treaty.  
2.2 The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle 
The War of Austrian Succession, which lasted from 1740-1748, was resolved by the 
Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. The war began because of the revocation of the agreement between 
Charles VI and the powers of Europe that his daughter would inherit his throne, or the Pragmatic 
Sanction. Emperor Charles VI wanted his daughter, Maria Theresa, to inherit the throne and have 
her husband elected Emperor.118 Many powers within and outside the Empire ratified the 
sanction. However, when Charles VI died on October 20, 1740,119 Prussia invaded, the Elector 
of Bavaria, Fredrick II, was elected Emperor, and a league was formed to oppose Maria Theresa 
(composed of many of those who guaranteed the sanction). When peace was finally declared, 
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Prussia kept the territory it invaded and the Elector of Bavaria kept the crown.120 The war was a 
stalemate with no one winning decisively - Great Britain won on the sea but France won on 
land.121 
When the Solution was revoked, the Empire was too weak to resist. The Emperor could 
have potentially secured the succession more securely, but it was too late. "Within the Empire 
the medieval idea of local independence had survived its disappearance in the great centralized 
monarchies. Since the Peace of Westphalia, the princes had exercised a recognized sovereignty 
within their own dominions...”.122  The concept of sovereign equality had influenced these 
regions and when there was a chance for the Elector of Bavaria to take over the monarchy, he 
took it. France had a heavy hand in the coup and installed Fredrick II on the Imperial throne. 
2.3 The Congress of Vienna 
The Congress of Vienna set out to end the Napoleonic Wars in 1814. Napoleon I's 
conquests included Holland, Belgium, parts of Germany, and Northern Italy. He also had 
influence over Naples because he made brother-in-law was the King.123 He abdicated in 1814, 
the Bourbons took over the government, and then he was banished to Elba. While the Congress 
was in session (from 1814-1815) to settle with all of the countries he had invaded, Napoleon 
returned and took over again until he was decisively defeated at Waterloo in June of 1815.124 
With the Napoleonic War then finished, the Congress resumed. Almost every European power 
was present at the Congress, except for Turkey.125 
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The Congress was focused on several principal matters. First was the state of the old 
Holy Roman Empire, which failed when Napoleon invaded. To remedy this, the Congress 
established the German Confederation. The Empire was falling apart for several reasons. The 
Peace of Westphalia had given the princes an ambiguous status that included independence while 
still remaining subordinate to the Emperor. And, the War of the Austrian Succession had further 
crippled the Empire.  
Napoleon's Confederation of the Rhine, under which he put all of his conquered 
territories in Central Europe, had largely kept the area stable. He reduced the vast composite 
system of the Holy Roman Empire from about eighteen-hundred down to thirty-six states. 
However, after his defeat it fell on the Congress of Vienna to address it. Instead of creating a 
reorganized Empire, the Congress established the German Confederation. It was ruled jointly by 
Austria and Prussia with Diets in Frankfurt. This system, as one would expect with there being 
two leaders, was slow and often ineffective in its administration "but it saved Germany from 
attack, while its very defects gave it the merit of being unaggressive."126 The Confederation did 
not last partly due to the divided attention the sovereigns in charge. They were over two separate 
territories, each with their own composite territories and unique systems. Once a dispute over the 
territory emerged, the Confederation fell apart and was officially dissolved by the Treaty of 
Prague in 1866.127 
The second matter that the Congress of Vienna dealt with was providing protection for 
the German Confederation and redrawing the map of Europe at that time so that it kept the 
balance of power in Europe. Great Britain and Denmark both gained some territory.128 The 
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Congress dealt fairly with France, according to Phillimore. However, this was because France 
was one of the great powers in Europe and it needed to be preserved to that the balance of power 
could be maintained. For this reason, the Congress reinstated the Bourbons to the throne and 
restored their previous power. This part of the treaty did not give rise to later dispute.129 
The third issue that the Congress attempted to resolve was putting the countries that 
Napoleon invaded back together. In this aspect, the Congress failed miserably. They did not 
succeed in creating lasting peace in Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Holland, Belgium 
or Poland. The Congress attempted to join Norway to Sweden and Holland to Belgium. Norway 
and Sweden lasted until 1905 but Holland and Belgium broke apart by 1831.130 Poland was 
already partitioned three times when Napoleon invaded the area. Some of the soldiers that fought 
under him were Polish and to reward them Napoleon created and gave them the Grand Duchy of 
Warsaw. The Congress of Vienna took this duchy and made the Kingdom of Poland with the 
Emperor of Russia as the sovereign.131 The Congress did attempt to provide for Polish rights in 
its stipulations to protect them regardless of who ruled.  
From this Congress came the Concert of Europe. According to political scientist Leo 
Gross, the Concert was a "self-appointed directing body for the maintenance and manipulation of 
that balance of power on which the European peace precariously reposed for about a hundred 
years." 132 It was loosely organized and fairly underdeveloped compared to the League of 
Nations and United Nations. There was no obligation required of the "Great Powers" and they 
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met more out of self-interest than anything else. However, thy did meet and intervened in several 
political crises after 1815, such as Greece and Belgium.  
The Congress definitely did not completely uphold sovereign equality. But it still was a 
step in its development. "In spite of the Congress of Vienna... the devolution of power to the 
level of the individual sovereign state...has permitted political and military adventures on the part 
of autonomous secular polities unconstrained by any limiting powers of an inter- or transnational 
sort..."133 While the Congress did not adhere to the principle, individual states retained power 
and were able to act unimpeded by the desires of the Concert of Europe. 
2.4 The Treaty of Versailles 
World War I began with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914 and 
lasted until 1918. It was resolved with the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in June 1919. This 
resolution outlined The Covenant of the League of Nations, blamed Germany for starting the 
war, and defined what the new boundaries of Europe and reparations were.  
The Treaty had fifteen parts to it and three hundred and eighty-six articles. For brevity, 
this paper will not analyze every single article, but it will look at those that have to do with 
sovereignty and any other topics of note. 134 Part I of the Treaty outlines the duties and structure 
of the League of Nations and will be examined in a later section. Part II redrew the boundary of 
Germany, included a map, and defined pertinent terms.   
Part III sets out the political clauses of the Treaty. Articles Thirty-one and Thirty-two 
stated that Germany was to acknowledge that Belgium was a sovereign state. Germany had not 
agreed to the Treaty of London in 1839 which had established Belgium as a state. Here, the 
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diplomats were establishing the sovereignty of another state through the treaty. The articles in 
this section also attempted to establish a method by which people could switch their citizenship 
as the boundary moved.  
In Section Two of Part III, the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg was reaffirmed. It was 
German territory but under this Treaty it became its own state.135 Section Three imposes 
restrictions on Germany's movements along the left bank of the Rhine River. Section Three of 
this part contains the clauses regarding Saar Basin - an area that Germany took over with several 
coal mines. This section reconciled how to transition this area to the French government while 
keeping the people's rights intact. Article Forty-nine offered a compromise between the land 
being a spoil of war and the people's right to have a say in who ruled them136 by stating that after 
fifteen years the people of Saar Basin will vote to determine which government they would 
prefer to be subjected to - the French or German.137  
Section five set out the decisions about Alsace-Lorraine. It claimed that the citizens of 
this territory were acquired by Germany against their wishes.138 They were to be returned to 
France immediately. Section six only had one article, Article Eighty, which stated that Austria 
was to be separate from Germany. Section Seven pertains to the Czecho-Slovak State. They were 
to be separate from Germany, in the same way as Austria, but the Germans were allowed to 
retain a specific territory that was outlined.  
In Article Sixty-two, it was required that the Czech State make a treaty with the Allied 
Powers for protection. This was an example of the protection system that the Charter of the 
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United Nations embodied later. Section Eight detailed the transition for Poland. They were no 
longer part of Germany but Article Eighty-eight required that a certain territory139 hold an 
election to decide if they wanted to be a part of Poland or Germany.140 Section Nine settled the 
territory of East Prussia. According to Article Ninety-four the citizens were to vote to decide 
whether they wanted to become part of Poland or their own state. Article Ninety-nine, the only 
article in Section Ten, merely stated that the territory of Memel141 was given to the Allied 
Powers by Germany.  
The topic of Section Eleven was the Free City of Danzig which was intended to be 
protected by the League of Nations. It was within the boundaries of Poland and the treaty 
implemented two measures to cultivate the city's relationship with the Polish government - 
Article One hundred-three dictated that the city must draw up a constitution and appoint a High 
Commissioner; in Article One hundred-four there was a "treaty" within the Treaty of Versailles 
between the city and Poland.142  
Part IV was meant to control the interests of Germany - it is entitled "German Rights and 
Interests Outside Germany."143 The first article, Article One hundred-eighteen, took away 
Germany's right to dispute the treaty and fight for their territories outside of the European 
continent. Section One addressed the German colonies - control was to go to the "the 
Government" in power there.144 Whether or not that means some local government that was in 
power before the area was colonized or it was to go to another European power is unclear. 
Section Two navigated redefining the relationship between China and Germany. Germany was 
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required to relinquish their territory and any special privileges obtained through treaties. Section 
Three listed the details of Germany and Siam's relationship. Section Four did the same for 
Germany and Liberia's relationship. Section Five transitioned Morocco from German to French 
authority. Section Six did the same for Egypt and control of the Suez Canal, except that they 
were transitioned to British authority. Section Seven merely stated that the terms of Turkey and 
Bulgaria will be examined at a later time. Section Eight put Japan in charge of the territory of 
Shantung.  
Part V will be covered more superficially because it detailed the military clauses which 
are not the focus of this paper. The treaty reduced the German military to a handful of units and 
did not allow them to produce submarines. Germany was also required to submit to the League 
of Nations if they requested to inspect their military. 
The rest of the Treaty dealt with various topics. Part VI dictated what was to be done with 
prisoners of war and burials. Part VII laid out the penalties for Germany. Article Two hundred-
twenty-seven "publicly arraigned" the German Emperor William II and demanded that the 
Netherlands, who had been giving him asylum, turn him over to be tried.145 Part VIII outlined 
what Germany was to pay in way of reparations. Part IX contained the financial clauses. In Part 
X, the economic clauses, Article Two hundred-eighty-one, it was determined that "if the German 
government engage[d] in international trade, it shall not in respect thereof gave or be deemed to 
have any rights, privileges or immunities of sovereignty."146 This article took away the 
sovereignty and rights of Germany as a result of its actions that took away the sovereignty of 
others. Part XI covered the clauses on aerial navigation. Part XII was focused on the ports, 
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waterways, and railways. Part XIII dealt with the issue of labor. Part XIV detailed the ways that 
the treaty was guaranteed. The final part, Part XV, contained miscellaneous provisions. 
Sterling Edmunds, an international law lecturer at St. Louis University, analyzed the 
Treaty of Versailles side by side with his interpretation law of nations147 in his book, 
International Law and the Treaty of Peace. Edmunds argued adamantly that the Treaty of 
Versailles did not uphold or act according to the law of nations - that "no modern treaty of peace 
has done this system such violence."148 He saw that the law was "ignored or violated where it 
conflicts with the purposes of the respective Allied and Associated Powers."149 Later, he 
remarked that there wasn't a peace treaty in modern times that was as severe as this one. The 
private citizens of Germany could not own land, trade, or a job.150 The German government was 
not allowed to bury the dead - the entire process had to be approved by the Allied Powers, 
including monuments.151 Edmunds commented that the Allies were expected to show more grace 
here than they did. The Allied Powers, as the winners of the war and those in power in Europe, 
had the opportunity to collectively decide to contradict the law when it suited their interests and 
took advantage of it. One thing that he did note the Treaty did well was that, in the way of 
dealing with German war criminals, it was "a wholesome step forward."152  
However, it was not necessary for the powers to put all of the burden, blame, and 
reparations for the war on Germany. In Article Sixty-three, the Allied Powers officially decided 
that Germany, alone, was responsible because they provoked war unjustly. Edmunds commented 
that "while it is within the power of a successful belligerent to impose any terms he wishes, the 
                                                 
147 Edmunds was mainly influenced by Vattel. 
148 Sterling E. Edmunds, International Law and the Treaty of Peace (Washington: Library of Congress, 1919), 3. 
149 Edmunds, International Law and the Treaty of Peace, 3. 
150 Edmunds, International Law and the Treaty of Peace, 31. 
151 Edmunds, International Law and the Treaty of Peace, 37. 
152 Edmunds, International Law and the Treaty of Peace, 3. 
45 
 
law of nations nowhere makes a distinction between a just and an unjust war, nor between a 
lawful and an unlawful war." 153 It was up to any government that declared war to decide what 
was just. Under the law of nations, war could not be unlawful from a moral standpoint "since it is 
the supreme and final appeal of all States in the protection of their well-being."154 This is an 
interesting statement by Edmunds because the law of nations does make a claim about what is a 
just reason to invade a territory, according to Vattel.155 
Edmunds, when he examined Part III of the Treaty, found several fallacies. In Article 
Thirty-two, the territory of Moresnet was annexed by Belgium with the Allied Power's consent 
but not the citizen's consent. In the eighteenth century, it was acceptable for the winner of a war 
to take conquered populations and make them part of their people. This was "no longer 
permissible, however, to hand such populations around, in view of the development of political 
principals which recognized the sovereignty of the people as the governing factor in the political 
and social life of civilized States." Sovereign equality (which stemmed from the law of nations 
and that all nations are made of equal people) had developed to where it had changed the 
expectations of the winners of wars. "This development has given rise to the plebiscite, under 
which the people may indicate en masse their wishes as to the disposition of the territory." The 
territory, in theory, must agree to transition under the new power but there was no guarantee of 
this consent in the Treaty.156 
Article Thirty-seven outlined the transition of the territories that Germany was giving to 
Belgium. It attempted to do so by giving the people a choice of whether or not to stay in the 
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territory - if they did, they would have to become citizens of Belgium. If they left, they could 
keep their German citizenship. This system was used throughout the Treaty to deal with the 
changed borders. Edmunds stated that "to force a new allegiance even upon the outcast Germans, 
and merely temporarily, as in this case, is none the less a violation of the law of nations." Other 
peace-making moments, such as the Congress of Vienna, did not attempt to do this. "On the 
contrary, in Article VII of the Treaty of Paris of 1815, it is declared that in all centers which shall 
change sovereigns a period of six years shall be allowed to the inhabitants, of whatsoever 
condition or nationality." In the Treaty of Versailles, citizens were only allowed two years to 
make a decision and move.157 In Article Fifty-three, the Treaty stated that the husband's choice 
of nationality covered his wife and his children, but this was usually ignored. A wife could have 
a different nationality from her husband.158 
The Treaty also violated the rights of citizens of, specifically, Saar Basin. In Article 
Forty-five, which addressed the population in the Saar Basin area, the mines were put under 
control of the French government. Edmunds noted that "the mines [were] privately owned, and is 
in effect an act of confiscation in violation of the spirit of the law." In taking over the mines, the 
treaty enabled the private citizens to be robbed.159 Article Forty-six put Saar Basin under the 
control of a governing commission. This disrupted the rights of German citizens in the area, 
Edmunds argued. One of the rights a government is supposed to afford its citizens is protection. 
However, there are displaced German citizens in this area and their government that they have 
given their allegiance to cannot protect them. The commission also undermined local authority 
because it did not specify how the people would play a role in the government.160  
                                                 
157 Edmunds, International Law and the Treaty of Peace, 16. 
158 Edmunds, International Law and the Treaty of Peace, 20. 
159 Edmunds, International Law and the Treaty of Peace, 17. 
160 Edmunds, International Law and the Treaty of Peace, 18. 
47 
 
Edmunds made various remarks on how the diplomats handled the affairs of various 
territories. On Poland, Edmunds remarked that it was partitioned away in 1705 and that this 
partition was confirmed by the Congress of Vienna.161 On East Prussia, he commented that "it 
[did] not appear that that nay right of option [was] given to the minority."162 Edmunds took a 
stronger stance on Article One hundred-fifteen, which dealt with Heligoland. He stated that there 
were "so many [restrictions], both negative and positive, and military and economic, have been 
imposed upon Germany by the present treaty that it is doubtful that Germany can be described as 
a fully sovereign state, at least during their continuance."163 This is an example of the Treaty of 
Versailles undermining the principle of sovereign equality because they imposed so many 
restrictions on a nation that it could not operate under its own authority. However, it could be 
argued that the law of nations condoned this because it does allow for a State's sovereignty to be 
compromised or taken away when they have done the same to another State.164 
Skipping ahead to Part VII, Edmunds made an interesting point about the arraignment of 
Emperor of Germany William II. The Emperor offended moral law and signed the legal order 
that directed his end and part in the war. In this way, his was guilty of the crimes that he was 
arraigned for. However, he was not arraigned on the charge of authoring orders that led to and 
continued the war. He was arraigned "'for a supreme offense against international morality and 
the sanctity of treaties.' There is no such offense in any penal code known to man." Combining 
this with the fact that "the most elemental principal of criminal jurisprudence is that no one can 
be punished for acts which, when committed, did not constitute a crime" makes the arraignment 
null. William II did offend the moral standards of the world, but these standards were not written 
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into law. A person cannot be tried if they did not break a law. Therefore, Edmunds concluded, 
William II could not be tried on this charge. But Article Two hundred-twenty-seven did arraign 
him on this charge.165 
Finally, it is worth noting that in Edmund's analysis of Part XII Article Three hundred-
twenty-seven he made a note of a further invasion of Germany's sovereignty. In the article, the 
navigation of the waterways through Germany is taken away. Edmunds noted that control of the 
territory and trade is an essential part of a government being sovereign. He concluded that "the 
provisions of article three hundred-twenty-seven constitute a further invasion of German 
sovereignty."166 
2.5 The League of Nations 
The League of Nations (1919) was the first intergovernmental organization in history and 
yet it was very weak. The Covenant that the League was established by is in Part I of the Treaty 
of Versailles (1919), which is presented and analyzed in the previous section. First, Part I of the 
Treaty will be summarized, then it will be analyzed by Sterling Edmunds, who is also introduced 
in the previous section.  
The goal of the League was to prevent war by forbidding "its members to resort to 
war...on pain of an immediate economic boycott by all the other members" and the League 
would take up a collection to assemble an army against the defiant country. Thus, it employed a 
two-fold attack toward any dissenting country. However, each country still within the League 
had the right to decide whether or not to boycott the defiant country.167 This greatly weakened 
the League's effectiveness. For the League to improve, P. H. Winfield suggested it hold all 
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countries to its membership in the League, that it forces every member to employ economic 
sanctions when instructed to, and that it should strengthen its military provision.168 This of 
course created a supra-national entity that could violate state's sovereignty in the interests of 
defending another's.  
Part I of the Treaty of Versailles defined and developed the structure and purpose of the 
League of Nations. Article One defined the requirements for and how a country joined the 
League and how they left. A country was added if two-thirds of the Assembly voted in favor. 169 
They were to be a free and independent state in order to join. If a country wanted to leave, they 
had to provide two years notice.170  
Article Two presented the structure of the League - there was to be an Assembly, a 
Council, and Secretariat. Articles Three through Six went into more detail about the structure. 
The Assembly was to have a representative from each country. Each representative had one vote 
and could have a maximum of three representatives. The Council had "Representatives of the 
Principal Allied and Associated Powers, together with Representatives of four other Members of 
the League."171 Each Member provided one representative that had one vote.172 The four 
representatives are added by the Assembly and the Council could add representatives to the 
Assembly.173 The Council was allowed to set its own agenda. Except for when it was otherwise 
specified, both the Council and the Assembly were required to have a unanimous vote to pass 
anything. The Secretariat Office appointments was permanent. This office consisted of a 
Secretary General who would sit at the head of the League and any other needed secretaries. The 
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Secretary General was appointed by the Council and approved by the Assembly. His pay was 
shouldered by the Members of the League.174  
Article Seven stated that the base of the League's operations was in Geneva, Switzerland 
but that this location could be changed. It also stated that "all positions...shall be open equally to 
men and women." The League stated that its goal was to maintain peace through disarmament in 
Article Eight. They intended to revisit this goal every ten years.175 Article Nine established a 
permeant commission to advise the League it on the goals outlined in Article Eight.  
In Article Ten, the writers invoke sovereign equality. Members "undertake to respect and 
preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political 
independence of all Members of the League." This article required that all of the members 
uphold the integrity and equality of the other members but necessarily those outside the 
League.176 His essentially secured sovereign equality within the League. However, according to 
Article Eleven all war was a concern of the League. Any Member could bring up any matter that 
was related to international relations, a right that was protected under Article Eleven. 177  
Article Twelve described how the League was to deal with internal disagreements. If 
Members disagreed with each other, to point that there was the potential for war, then they had to 
submit the terms of the disagreement to the Council. Once the Council made a decision, the 
Members were not allowed to fight about the issue for three months after the decision.178 Article 
Thirteen requires Members to settle disagreements by arbitration, accept the Council's decision, 
and to "not resort to war." If Members do go to war, then the Council will take steps.179 The 
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Permanent Court of Justice was established in Article Fourteen, which should have helped with 
mediating between Members. Article Fifteen stated that if a matter was not submitted to 
arbitration, then the Council was to try and settle matter. If they failed, the Assembly could take 
over and make the decision or they could publish a report with their findings.180 If any Member 
declared war against anyone it was considered a declaration against the entire League under 
Article Sixteen. Members were called on to enact financial and economic punishments that the 
League would collectively employ against rebellious States. The Assembly had the power to 
remove a State from the League, if the vote to do so was unanimous, under the same article.181  
The League's method for navigating external conflict was outlined in Article Seventeen. 
If an external conflict were to arise between a Member and a Nonmember, then the Nonmember 
would be asked to join the League. If the Nonmember accepted, then the matter could be handled 
as an internal conflict. If not, then the League would employ the same collective punishment that 
was outlined in Article Sixteen.182 
The writers of the Covenant wanted to make the League a priority to countries. They did 
this by regulating the agreements that Members entered into. Article Eighteen demanded that the 
Members register any and all treaties they entered into. The treaty was not valid until it was 
registered with the League. The Assembly could not stop a Member from entering into a treaty 
"whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world," but they could advise against it 
under Article Nineteen.183 Article Twenty does just this - it stated that Members should have 
prioritized the Covenant and not engage in any agreements that would compromise its 
commitment to the League, peace, or that would be inconsistent with the Covenant. The 
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Covenant did set limits on the power of the League. Article Twenty-one upholds international 
understands and gave the Monroe Doctrine as an example. 184 Article Twenty-four dictated that 
all the previous treaties that Members entered into the League with were to be reviewed by 
them.185 
Article Twenty-two covered how to interact with States that were colonies and are 
unstable. These States were called "Mandatories" and the League would issue mandates and 
established commission to assist them in becoming more stable. 186 
Article Twenty-three went into more depth about the League's goals. They were trying to 
ensure fair working conditions, "just treatment of the native inhabitants of" colonies, reduce 
trafficking (human, drug, and arms), free international trade, and reduction of international 
disease.187 In support of these goals, all of the Members were required to support the Red Cross 
under Article 25.188 
Finally, the Covenant ended - excluding the Annex for this part - with Article Twenty-
six. This last article outlined the amendment process for the covenant. The amendment must 
have been ratified by the majority. If a State did not ratify an amendment but the majority did the 
dissenting State would cease to be a Member.189 
Edmunds essentially panned the League of Nations covenant when he analyzed Part I of 
the Treaty of Versailles. He argued that the League was a "reactionary institution rather than a 
progressive one."190 Not only this, but the League was also created without the influence of 
international law. "There is not a single reference to international law in the whole covenant that 
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points to any definite plan whatever for the progressive improvement and extension of that 
law."191 This is critical because the League was focused on international cooperation. The lack of 
reference to something that should have been involved in the foundation could have contributed 
to why this organization ultimately failed.  
The League of Nations was not as inclusive as it should have been, as a world 
organization. Only forty-five countries were invited when there were an estimated seventy-four 
countries that qualified in Europe alone. An analysis by a Cambridge professor in 1910192 
suggested that there were twenty-one states in the Americas, one state in Asia, and one state in 
Africa that met the requirements for joining the League which adds up to a total of ninety-seven 
qualifying states. Less than half were invited to join. 
Edmunds claimed that the League's structure was hypocritical and overbearing. It was to 
such an extent that he claimed it "confound[ed] all previously accepted principles with respect to 
international personality and sovereignty." The article stated that "any fully self-governing state, 
dominion, or colony may become a member" as long as it was approved by a two-thirds 
majority. Edmunds pointed out that if, by this definition, the writers meant that these states were 
free and independent then, for example, the British Empire should have been broken up. A true 
colony would not have been a part of international negotiations because they would have been 
considered a territory of the colonizer. Therefore, any empire would not have been able to 
continue as they had been. Further, "no genuine league of nations can be founded upon such 
basic inequalities."193 Also in Article One was the requirement that members of the League give 
a two-year notice of their intent to leave the organization. Edmunds argued that this instruction 
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reduced the countries to "wards" of the organization, which implied the writers were essentially 
treating other countries like children.194  
Another flaw in the setup of the League is that there was no set time or organization for 
the Assembly meetings. The only instruction is that they could be called by the U. S. 
President.195 The Council, therefore, could potentially take over operation of the League. The 
structure of the Council certainly enables this and "equality disappears at this point, the five 
constituting themselves an indefeasible majority." This is unallowable and inconsistent with the 
general purpose of the League. Edmunds argued that "every attempt at organizing a league of 
nations must start from and keep intact the independence and equality of all civilized states." 
Sovereign equality must play a large role in an international organization that is committed to 
cooperation. The structure of the Council did not uphold this.  
Edmund's analysis of Article Ten revealed another flaw in the Covenant. The article 
restated one of the acceptable circumstances for compromising another State's sovereignty - 
when the State is being aggressive. However, as Edmunds pointed out, there were other lawful, 
accepted situations where it would have been acceptable to invade another State. These were 
self-defense, if a treaty allowed and arbitration failed, "on the grounds of humanity," and if there 
was a group being oppressed. The Covenant did not address or recognize these other instances 
that were allowed under international law.196  
While the Covenant discussed what to do "under threat of war" in Article Eleven, there is 
no definition given for this term. 197 Therefore, this description could be manipulated to mean 
whatever a Member needed it to, and the League could have gone to war over anything that the 
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Covenant did not specify.198 This term is especially powerful because later in the Covenant its 
stated that war anywhere is of concern to the League.  
Similarly, any State's action in its domestic sphere could have given rise to an 
international incident. Article Fifteen required that any issue that could give rise to a dispute 
must be submitted to the Council. This gave the League a lot of power over domestic or 
individual state affairs as well as international affairs.199  
The method of settling disputes gave the League too much power over domestic affairs, 
according to Edmunds. Article Seventeen, which outlined this process, gave the League the 
ability to mediate any dispute that did - or could be argued to - affect international relations, 
whether or not the States agreed to such mediation. "It necessarily involve[d] a denial of the 
heretofore accepted principals of the equality and independence of States."200 By giving itself the 
authority to revoke the decision of another state, the League was defying sovereign equality.  
Member States were required to detangle themselves from any treaties that were 
inconsistent with the goals and values of the League. Edmunds stated that "it is clear that 
different standards will be applied as between the principal Allied and Associated Powers, on the 
one hand, and the small states on the other." He expected there to be a continued inequality of 
the application of the law between the Allied Powers and the smaller states in the League.201  
In Article Twenty-two it was stated that the Council would keep the States that inherited 
the German colonies in check. Edmunds pointed out that all of the Powers that were on the 
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Council, except for Belgium, were the States that inherited the colonies. Therefore, they would 
be charged with keeping themselves in check, which had huge potential to turn corrupt.202  
Finally, Edmunds commented on the amendment process. He claimed that "the structure 
contemplate[d] not an association of equals but the subordination of the many to the authority of 
the few. The overruling is not a diplomatic assembly but a small group in which unequal 
representation exist[ed]" that ruled over the larger body of States. The way which a State was 
made to exit if they did not ratify an amendment was absolute and powerful.203 
The League of Nations ultimately failed and was dissolved with World War II as it had 
failed to accomplish its goal of creating and maintaining world peace. It was a flawed system but 
also one of the first attempts at an international peace organization. It was bound to have some 
flaws, but its problems began from the outset with its public script of upholding each Member's 
sovereign equality but in its actual structure it took away from the smaller states. The League, in 
being an organization that supersedes any individual state’s authority, seemed to inherently take 
away from the participating state’s sovereign equality, even as its purpose was to protect it. The 
League does both – it takes detracts from and secures a state’s sovereign equality in the same 
way that a government takes away from the rights of an individual and protects those rights at 
the same time.   
Despite Edmund’s harsh opinion of the League, it was an important development in 
international law. While organizations like it had existed before, they were limited in reach and 
authority.204 The League truly represented the first attempt at an organization to codify and 
enforce international law – and have the authority to do so. 
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2.6 The Charter of the United Nations 
The United Nations Charter (1945) was a direct response to World War II and is 
important to consider in the context of the development of sovereign equality. Sovereign equality 
and the United Nations have a complicated, convoluted relationship similar to the League of 
Nation's relationship with sovereign equality.  
Gerry Simpson's article published in 2000 entitled "The Great Powers, Sovereign 
Equality, and the Making of the United Nations Charter" claimed to show how "institution-
building in the legal order [was] regarded as an attempt at reconciliation between" two core 
values - hegemony and sovereign equality.205 He began by defining sovereign equality as: "the 
notion that states are formally equal or are entitled to some sort of equality under or before or in 
creation of the law." Simpson's goal was to examine this concept's relationship with the concept 
of the "Great Powers." By great powers, Simpson meant states that "possess immense economic, 
military, and political resources." However, he claims further that these. resources are not all it 
took to be a great power. Simpson asserts that "what makes them Great Powers, though, is the 
legal recognition of their states as superior powers by others in the society of states" and by 
themselves.206 Their power being recognized is an important indicator of the hegemony they set 
up. They are the opposite of outlaw states because they have special privileges while outlaw 
states "are denied standard rights."207 These concepts of great powers and outlaw states conflict 
with the concept of all states being equal. This is what Simpson explored in his article. 
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According to Simpson, there were three sets of powers that came together to ratify the 
United Nations charter: the great powers, the small and middle powers, and the enemy states.208 
They all had different interests and goals. The great powers entered the discussion with the "idea 
of an executive-led, collective security regime." This four-policeman model "dominated the 
thinking of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union delegates in 
particular." These three states and China were to be the four policemen. The small and middle-
sized states came in worrying about the great power's authority in the Charter. While they did 
agree that these powers had a special role in the international system, they feared their role was 
exaggerated in the talks that had led up to the drafting of the Charter. The enemy states were 
countries that were considered "outsiders." They were initially not intended to have a role in the 
organization or to be in it. Simpson noted that this idea of "enemy states" was, therefore, 
ingrained in the development of the organization and its structure, just as the ideas that the other 
sets of powers came in with.209  
The great powers pushed a hegemony that they had created before coming to discuss with 
the other nations. These powers attempted to obscure this intent by using the term "collective 
security."210 This did not surprise many negotiators, if any. In fact, Simpson claims, it seemed 
inevitable to most. The great powers justified their actions a few ways, mainly that they had a 
special responsibility because they were so powerful. With great power comes great 
responsibility.211 Another justification was that the seats on the Security Council - and the 
majority of the power within the organization - were given to these select states as a reward for 
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sacrificing more than the other states. 212 There was a third justification as well that continues 
into today. Simpson stated that: "Ironically, one of the primary justifications for hegemony was, 
and continues to be, linked to the idea that 'substantial' sovereign equality could best be 
preserved by resort to legal hegemony." Essentially, the smaller states needed bodyguards to 
ensure their sovereign equality against threats to it. This hegemony is remarkably similar to the 
balance of power doctrine and the Concert of Europe. Both of these latter concepts involved 
more powerful states dictating the affairs of the continent. All of the justifications for hegemony 
in the twentieth century cumulated "in a process that was, initially, openly elitist" and enforced 
certain state's power. While the United Nations was supposed to be about equality between 
nations, as it was stated in Article 2.7 of the Charter: 
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
 intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or 
 shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter, 
 but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under 
 Chapter VII.213 
 
However, even into the signing of the charter - where the four previously mentioned countries 
signed first - it was openly not equal in its conception and design.214 Simpson concluded by 
remarking on this combination of equality and hegemony:  
A norm of sovereign equality, then, created a level of artificial parity between the great 
 powers themselves in the Security Council just as legalised hegemony ordered relations 
 between the core and peripheral states. This combination of parity and hegemony 
 became a mark of the new international legal order.215  
 
Between the powers, there was equality. Between the powers and the other states, there was 
hegemony. But the justifications all along the way invoked equality between states and before 
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international law. The combination of these two contradictory principles in this unique manner is 
the hallmark of our modern international system and a continuation from the Concert of Europe 
and the League of Nations.  
Even as hegemony was being talked about and understood as a reality of the 
organization, sovereign equality was also invoked as a foundational principle of the United 
Nations. The previously quoted article is the definition of sovereign equality - there is no 
interference in the internal affairs of any of the countries, but they are still required to submit to 
international law.  
Simpson sought to explain and comment on this contradiction. He claimed that sovereign 
equality was the concept influencing the great powers to try to "govern" the smaller states.216 
The smaller states, as they were less powerful, needed their sovereignty to be protect by the great 
powers. The smaller states were very concerned about the great powers trying to "protect" them 
and feared the "four-policemen" model. Simpson suggested that since the smaller states 
expressed concerns about the potential for interference from the great powers, the great powers 
had to be careful in how they advocated for hegemony.217 As part of this effort, the United States 
State Department replaced 'equality of nations' with 'sovereign equality' "on the basis that 
sovereign equality was a principle more consistent with the dominance of the great power," or 
hegemony.218 In other words, the State Department, from Simpson’s point of view, was looking 
to disguise the hegemonic nature of the new system by introducing this new term.  
All of the powers were able to agree on three things - that sovereign equality was a 
cornerstone of the new system, that departures form the principle would be needed to install and 
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maintain the new security regime and make it effective,219 and, finally, that the justification for 
these departures stemmed from legal principles or because it was deemed necessary.220 "There 
was a recognition that special privileges were at variance with the principle of sovereign equality 
'from a democratic, legal, and theoretical point of view' but that these privileges were politically 
necessary."221 The hegemonic structure was, therefore, was part of sovereign equality, according 
to Simpson’s interpretation of the Charter. 
One part of the United Nations that was, perhaps, truly equal is the General Assembly. 
Everyone is represented and there are no special powers for the great powers. Simpson noted that 
while many interpret this body as weak and irrelevant, he thinks that this view underestimated 
"both its constitutional power and its symbolic impact."222 It wields a fair amount of power - all 
of the councils, including the Security Council, report to it. The Assembly can order studies, 
recommend action, "promote cooperation," was given power over the budget, and was given 
power over appointments to the councils. The Assembly succeeded in preserving sovereign 
equality in a few ways.223 Every country was allowed one representative and every 
representative was allowed one vote.224  
The focus of the compromise between sovereign equality and hegemony was the Security 
Council and its powers. "It was assumed that the principle of sovereign equality would appear in 
a prominent place in the Charter." The smaller states tried to accomplish this by diluting the 
hegemony. There were three proposed ways to dilute the hegemony - through the power of the 
Security Council’s veto, the structure of the Security Council, and by subjecting the Security 
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Council to some other entity or person. The small states attempted to make the veto power of the 
Security Council less absolute225 but ultimately failed.226 The second method, adding more 
members to the Security Council on a non-permanent basis with the great powers having 
permanent seats227 - also failed. Membership in the Security Council has not changed since 
1945.228 The last change that was proposed did ultimately succeed. The smaller states were able 
to put the Security Council under the jurisdiction of the General Assembly. The Assembly was 
given the "right to be kept abreast of all questions being dealt with by the Security Council, but 
virtually every other modification was rejected."229 While the smaller states did manage to put 
the Security Council under the General Assembly, chapter VII allowed the Council to define its 
own powers and act independently. Even with these efforts to dilute the hegemony, it was still 
"entrenched in the resultant institution."230  
The Charter acknowledged sovereign equality in several ways and places. Simpson noted 
Articles One,231 Two, Fifty-five232, and Seventy-eight.233 "There articles clearly do not prelude 
organisational hierarchy, but they do confirm that the UN continues to be based on the same idea 
of state sovereignty and an insistence that 'UN organs must also treat states equally."234 The 
smaller states were essentially faced with the choice of a flawed organization or no organization 
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at all, since the great powers refused to compromise on their power. This was essentially a 
pragmatic acceptance of rule of the powerful states that was in place long before the United 
Nations. The smaller states chose to go ahead with the Charter.235 "The Charter creates an 
international order in which the sovereign equality of all states was adapted to the prerogatives of 
the great powers. It represents neither the vindication of sovereign equality...nor its passing." 
Simpson concluded by making a broader claim about sovereign equality being understood as a 
stand-alone principle: "Instead, sovereign equality needs to be understood as a raft of principles, 
some of which survive the creation of semi-centralized constitutional orders, others of which are 
severely compromised as a consequence." The concept played a larger part in the understanding 
and development of the international system, but it alone does not contribute or rule the 
international system. This being said, the Charter still "enacts a weakened form of legal equality 
alongside a mildly constrained constitutional hegemony." 236 While every country is willing to 
acknowledge equality between them, this is often not shown in practice. Even as this was seen as 
an inevitability, it was still fought against. Equality between nations is still a developing concept 
that is struggling to exist without hegemony and inequality.  
It is important to note that while "all states, whether great or small, [were] equal so far as 
legal rights go...politically, they [were] not equal and this is recognized by international law" 
when there is an alliance of influential powers - such as the "Great Powers" in Europe in the later 
part of the 1900s. This group and the countries that were a part of it would have more power than 
a single country.237 However, this "[laid] at Westphalia's feet the responsibility for having 
sanctioned precisely the proto-totalitarian authoritarianism associated with the state's right to 
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both preemptive aggression against potential foes from the outside and to normative 'domestic 
jurisdiction' within as well."238 In short, in establishing this concept of sovereign equality, the 
Peace of Westphalia also allowed for a powerful "protector" group to emerge that would take 
away the equality of smaller states in order to better protect their equal status. Because, while all 
states were equal before the law, they were not all equal in power.    
                                                 




3.1 In Favor of the Importance Placed on the Peace of Westphalia 
Whether or not the Peace of Westphalia established the concept of sovereign equality in 
European international relations is still debated. Leo Gross is usually credited as being the most 
influential scholar to propound the thesis in favor of the Peace of Westphalia in his 1948 article, 
"The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948." Indeed, his article partially inspired this paper because 
he forged a pathway to explore multiple treaties to see if they embraced sovereign equality.239  
Gross considered the Peace of Westphalia to be the first attempt at international unity "on 
the basis of states exercising untrammeled sovereignty over certain territories and subordinated 
to no earthly authority."240 By this, he meant that the Pope and the pervasive acceptance of 
Catholicism definitively no longer ruled and unified the international system. The Peace, he 
argued, had a "continued influence" throughout history on international organization.241 It was 
influential because it established it established religious toleration when Catholicism had 
previously served as the universal religion in Europe. It protected minority religions and, in 
doing so, allowed for all countries in Europe to become equal. Gross argued that the Peace 
allowed for an international system based on equality between nations: 
It is this conception of an international society embracing, on a footing of equality, the 
 entire human race irrespective of religion and form of government which is usually said 
 to have triumphed in the seventeenth century over the medieval conception of a more 
 restricted Christian society organized hierarchically, that is, on the basis on inequality.242  
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Gross did acknowledge that the Peace of Westphalia did not do this perfectly. The Peace of 
Westphalia did uphold the Peace of Augsburg and the rule cujus regio ejus religio. However, 
Gross pointed out things that the Peace did well - specifically that it protected religious worship 
and divided the German Diet by religion (half Catholic, half Protestant). "The principle of 
religious equality was placed as part of the peace under an international guarantee. The Peace of 
Westphalia thereby established a precedent of far-reaching importance."243 Equality between 
countries, therefore, was established with the Peace of Westphalia, according to Gross. 
Another reason that the Peace of Westphalia was so influential was the guarantees it 
promised. Gross noted that "both treaties declare that the peace concluded shall remain in force 
and that all parties" were obliged to uphold it against any attack, regardless of their religion. Of 
course, guarantees in treaties were not a new concept and the guarantees in the Peace were not 
much different from previous ones. But the resulting structure of the Holy Roman Empire 
abolished all previous influence over other European states through dynastic politics. The Peace 
ensured continued political decentralization in Central Europe by confirming the sovereignty 
within the Empire of individual states, which then, with their newly won authority, established 
themselves as absolutist states.244 The combination of the nature of the clauses and the guarantee 
and agreement behind them is what made the Peace Europe's first "international constitution."245  
The Peace went further than just guaranteeing the clauses, it provided a roadmap for how 
countries were to deal with disputes. The Peace offered a dispute resolution mechanism that 
created pathways to either a peaceful accord or a justification for way if a solution proved 
impossible. This, Gross argued, was unique to the Peace of Westphalia and new to peace keeping 
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and making. This provision was flawed although it did serve as a Model for subsequent efforts to 
create a platform for the resolution of international disputes.246 These differences from the 
previous treaties is what distinguished the Peace of Westphalia as important.  
But Gross also added that it was not just the actual clauses of the Peace that made it so 
influential for the future. How the Peace was thought of later and its implications contributed 
greatly to its importance. HE claimed that "the Peace of Westphalia was the starting point for the 
development of modern international law." The Peace, along with the subsequent work of Hugo 
Grotius developed the international system as we know it. Gross went so far to say: 
It can hardly be denied that the Peace of Westphalia marked an epoch in the 
 evolution of international law. It undoubtedly promoted the laicization of international 
 law by divorcing it from any particular religious background, and the extension of its 
 scope so as to include, on a footing of equality, republican and monarchial states.247 
 
Gross claimed that the Peace did mark a change in treaties and how diplomats acted during 
negotiations. By secularizing international law, the Peace put all the states on the same footing. 
Regardless of the validity, Gross is compelling when he stated that "the Peace of Westphalia, for 
better or worse, marks the end of an epoch and the opening of another."248 Whether this change 
was as decisive as Gross suggested is the question that has propelled this paper.  
The Peace of Westphalia challenged the Pope's authority, which was not new. The Pope 
was being challenged before the Peace. The Pope condemned the Peace with the Bull Zel Domus 
in November of 1648, but it did not change anything. The Peace was said to be "a public act of 
disregard of the international authority of the Papacy."249 Gross claimed that, at this time, "the 
idea of an authority or organization above the sovereign states is no longer. What takes its place 
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is the notion that all states form" a single states-system.250 This did not prove to be true because 
international organizations have formed throughout European history, as evidenced in chapter 
two of this paper. There are at least two formal organizations that have been over sovereign 
states - the League of Nations and the United Nations. While these organizations are secular and 
not religious like the Pope and the Catholic church, it is worth noting that at this point, sovereign 
equality seems to dictate that there be nothing else influencing the state. 
3.2 Criticisms of the Importance Placed on the Peace of Westphalia 
There have been several critiques of Gross's claim, especially in the early 2000s. Peter 
Stirk, a Senior Lecturer on International Affairs at Durham University, published one such 
critique in 2012. He focused on Gross's claims about the contribution of the Peace of Westphalia 
to the development of sovereign equality.251 Stirk reexamined how sovereign equality came to be 
associated with the Peace and the purpose behind the link. He concluded that the connection 
between the Peace and sovereign equality "is not only bad history but is also a hinderance to the 
contemporary study of International Relations."252  
Stirk began by looking at the society of the seventeenth century, which he said was 
generally hierarchal. This argument led to the conclusion that the Peace was perceived in the 
seventeenth century as "restorative not innovative.” “In diplomacy that meant protracted and 
bitter disputes over precedence." This still could have led to a cry for equality from the smaller 
states, either by making themselves equal amongst each other or with the more powerful states. 
Stirk argued that "this was not, however, an equality based upon a general principle but a 
clamour by each for enhancement of its own status, preferably at the expense of others, in an 
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international hierarchy." This cry for equality, then, was not for the sake of morality or principle, 
it was for power.253 Stirk argued, based on this contextual analysis, that the Peace merely 
reaffirmed the status quo of European relations.  
Stirk further argued that Gross's claim that, by allowing states to negotiate and agree to 
treaties with outside states, the Peace recognized sovereignty and equality of states is false. There 
are two reasons that Stirk presented for this. First, this was not a new right being granted but an 
old one that was being reaffirmed. Second, this claim "presumes a linkage between a right to 
conclude treaties, the state and sovereignty which was far from established in the middle of the 
sixteenth century." Stirk argued that scholars have associated the right of a state to negotiate with 
external states with sovereignty. This link between being able to negotiate with outside states on 
equal footing was not new, according to Stirk, nor was it understood at the time that there was a 
link between equality and the right to sign a treaty with another nation. In the same vein, 
sovereignty was not understood in the same manner as it is today.254 Stirk concluded that "there 
was little trace of sovereign equality in the peace of Westphalia or indeed of a modern 
conception of sovereignty at all." They did not invoke sovereign equality in any sense.255 
According to Stirk, even later, in the eighteenth century, equality was still not an 
established concept but it was gaining ground. There was still an effort to gain hierarchal power 
in Europe and society was still predominantly hierarchal.256 The focus was still on accumulating 
glory and honor. There was more of an effort to remove "passions" from government to provide 
"a more stable guide for rulers and states." The push for equality between states, according to 
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Stirk, came from Emmerich de Vattel257 who argued that because all men are equal and all 
nations are made of men, all nations must, therefore, be equal. However, Stirk pointed out that 
Vattel was challenging, not confirming, diplomatic practice during his time. Stirk claimed that 
"Vattel knew this...Yet this did not affect the force of his argument." Vattel defied the system 
that he was under in his work.  
Stirk argued for another reason that there was not a link between the Peace of Westphalia 
and sovereign equality. He claimed that scholars in the eighteenth century saw the Holy Roman 
Empire differently than scholars today. "Most eighteenth-century commentators did not perceive 
a conglomeration of independent and equal states under the shadow of the empty shell of a 
former empire as later interpretations would see it." Twentieth century scholars claimed that, 
after 1648, the Empire was no longer a state because the territories would have qualified as 
independent states. Stirk opposed this view because it did not align with how eighteenth-century 
scholars saw the Holy Roman Empire. 258 
Stirk pointed out that, historically, the Peace of Westphalia was not always considered to 
be the treaty that established sovereign equality in European international relations. For writers 
in the eighteenth century, the Treaty of Utrecht was "the watershed treaty in establishing the new 
order of state-integrity and a balance of power." 259 The Peace of Westphalia was aimed at 
resolving tensions, not instituting a new world order. Stirk then concluded that "almost none of 
the elements of the image of the peace of Westphalia as an epoch-making transition to a world of 
sovereign equality" were present in the eighteenth century.  
                                                 
257 Stirk, "The Westphalian model and sovereign equality," 647. 
258 Stirk, "The Westphalian model and sovereign equality," 648. 
259 Stirk, "The Westphalian model and sovereign equality," 650. All of the information for this paragraph comes 
from this source and page. 
71 
 
What was needed to show that the Peace of Westphalia did establish sovereign equality in 
Europe was Stirk asked. Stirk listed out what he believed was needed to prove that the Peace was 
the starting point of sovereign equality: 
Greater doctrinal insistence on equality that could find firmer footing in diplomatic 
 practice; considerable slackening in the dominance of national law arguments and the 
 emergence of a historical sociology of law; greater consensus about the universality of a 
 clear concept of sovereignty; the disappearance or marginalisation of structures that 
 would be seen as manifestly incompatible with the image; some sense of a unified 
 modern epoch in international relations.260 
 
Stirk concluded that these requirements did not get met until the nineteenth century, when the 
Peace of Westphalia began to be strongly associated with sovereign equality. But it was 
associated unevenly and with resistance.  
Stirk claimed that analysis of nineteenth century developments had to begin with the 
Congress of Vienna because it shaped international relations for the nineteenth century. He 
concluded that the Congress "showed little respect, either in the conduct of the Congress or in its 
outcome for principled equality of states. Stirk agreed with Gerry Simpson, who aptly 
summarized relations among the Congress states as a form of legalized hierarchy." This did not 
mean that equality was not invoked during the Congress at all. But when it was, Stirk claimed 
that it was used as a ploy to gain the upper hand in political situations.261 The concept carried 
weight in the negotiations because the response from other states was to submit to it. The 
Congress, in a general sense, invoked a weakened, qualified sense of sovereignty so that it would 
be compatible with the hierarchy that was already heavily integrated. A stronger concept of 
sovereign equality did gain ground during this time. But it still relied on Vattel's earlier 
arguments about the law of nations. "Indeed, Vattel's argument was so influential that one late 
                                                 
260 Stirk, "The Westphalian model and sovereign equality," 650. 
261 Stirk, "The Westphalian model and sovereign equality," 651. 
72 
 
nineteenth century author" repeated it and did not even bother to mention Vattel's name. Critics 
called sovereign equality baseless yet prevalent.262  
Stirk also explained how the Peace came to occupy this role in international relations 
history. During the nineteenth century, Stirk argued that the natural evolution of European law 
was their current international law system. Since the principle of equality was also argued to be 
part of the European law, it made sense to look for its origin, for which the Peace of Westphalia 
was a candidate. Stirk claimed that the combination of the lessening of "overt doctrines of 
natural law," diplomatic insistence on the principle, and the simplification of the world map most 
likely explains the link between the Peace and sovereign equality in the nineteenth century.263 
The conclusions on this link varied but were all in agreement on the principal claim. It seemed, 
to Stirk, that despite the thorough recognition of sovereign equality, the international order 
tended back toward a hierarchal structure. Instead, it was under a committee instead of a Pope or 
Emperor.264 The distinction between "equal protection of the law" and an "equal capacity for 
rights" became a source of disagreement. There was a big difference between the two - in the 
latter, the subjects are to "have exactly the same rights and not merely the idea that each legal 
subject should have such rights as it happened to have protected." The equal capacity for rights is 
a concept that is seem as more aspirational whereas the equal protection of the law is seen as the 
reality.265 
In the mid to late twentieth century the debate centered around the United Nations 
Charter. There was a large clash between sovereign equality and hegemony, as explored early in 
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this paper.266 Stirk reaffirmed that the struggle came down to there being an imperfect 
organization or none at all. Even with this struggle between hegemony and equality, Stirk noted 
that: "Yet the doctrine of equality, the doctrine of Vattel and the equality of dwarf and the giant, 
increasingly, triumphed in the sense that the normative presumption in favor equality largely 
discredited principled arguments for hierarchy." During these debates, Leo Gross published his 
influential article "The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948."267 Stirk cited Gross's article a few 
times throughout his article but did not directly respond to any of his specific claims. 
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Productive and unsuccessful compromises can both be found in almost every treaty. One 
of the unsuccessful actions of the Peace of Westphalia was "that it established a number of 
Princes and states in an anomalous position of quasi-independence, most of them so weak that 
they could not resist the encroachments of France or Sweden” in its attempt to give the princes 
more rights over their territory.268 This made them easily susceptible to external influences.  
Another unsuccessful compromise was the Peace gave France and Sweden the right to 
interfere in with the internal affairs of the Holy Roman Empire because they were the guarantors 
of the treaties.269 In Article V Section Forty-one, the Queen of Sweden, specifically, was allowed 
to "intervene amicably and intercede humbly" on behalf of the Protestants in the Empire. 270 
While this alone does not necessarily infringe on the Empire's sovereignty, a clause similar to 
this was confirmed in the Congress of Vienna which had allowed for the partitioning away of 
Poland. Clauses like this contain the potential for the destruction of sovereignty. The Queen of 
Sweden could have used this clause to invade the Holy Roman Empire and justified it under her 
duties as the guarantor of the Peace of Westphalia.  
The unsuccessful parts of the Peace of Westphalia should not overshadow what it did 
achieve. The Peace did manage to facilitate peace among states divided by the religious schism 
that had sprung in 1517.  It did this by ensuring that there were an equal number of Protestants 
and Catholics who assembled at the Diet and allowed matters that related only to Protestants be 
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addressed only by them, and the same with the Catholic members. It was the final blow to the 
Pope's influence in Europe and facilitated the emergence of a system of sovereign equality.  
In his article, Stirk failed to talk about the role of religion in the Peace of Westphalia. But 
religion played a large role in politics of the era of the Protestant Reformation and in the causes 
of the Thirty Years War. The argument for sovereign equality beginning with the Peace uses the 
fact that the Peace is focused on remedying the fractures that were cause by religion. It removed 
religion as the binding force within a country. Redefining the role of religion in government, at 
that time and in Europe, was a large part of what the Peace accomplished. For Stirk to not make 
it a part of his argument is a large misstep on his part.  
There was a disconnect between Gross and Stirk's arguments. Stirk was focused on what 
happened at after the Peace, while Gross was looking at what happened before the Peace. They 
each came away with different conclusions, probably due to their differences in scope. Also, 
Stirk claimed that the Peace was seen and used in 1948 as a symbol of the system of nation states 
(this was in Europe as well, not just America with Gross).271 However, also in 1948, the Peace 
was seen by some scholars as allowing other European powers to dominate Germany and stunt 
its growth. This would have been the opposite of sovereign equality.272 These two views existed 
at the same time, but the former was much more proliferate. 
Stirk had a valid point when he said that scholars need to be careful about imposing our 
current understanding on sovereignty onto the seventeenth century. However, he failed to 
address the thought that sovereign equality, of course, would not have sprung forth perfectly 
formed and executed right after Westphalia. Gross may have implied this in his article, which 
every scholar should have a problem with. The history of sovereign equality showed a 
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progression towards its full implementation between nations, culminating thus far in the United 
Nations Charter. It was not invoked perfectly, and still is not, but there was definitely a change 
after the Peace of Westphalia. That cannot be denied.  
The development and implementation of sovereign equality was uneven and marred, but 
it is unreasonable to expect it to be anything else. Very few concepts develop uniformly across 
history and sovereign equality is no exception. The Treaty of Utrecht began because external 
states intervened in another country's internal affairs. By trying to change who inherited the 
throne of Spain, these countries were diminishing, even taking away, the Spanish government's 
sovereignty and equality. They felt that they were justified in intervening because they were 
doing so in order to maintain the balance of power in Europe. In the end, the Spanish 
government did get the person that they wanted to rule them, just with the stipulation that he 
could not also be king of France (even though those ties did continue to matter, as in both 
intervening in the American Revolution; and both siding with each other in the revolutionary 
wars). Sovereign equality did end up prevailing but after a war and under certain conditions.  
The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle grappled with the nature of sovereignty, but it has not 
been examined within the context of sovereign equality, that the author can find. Maria Theresa 
and her husband had the legal and dynastical right to rule. The Elector of Bavaria, Fredrick II, 
had other plans and executed them well. While his coup did result in war, he remained the 
Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. One could argue, however, that because the government 
was behind Fredrick II and not Maria Theresa, that sovereign equality was upheld. But again, its 
application was uneven because Great Britain and France were involved in the war. What is most 
interesting is how many of the states in the Holy Roman Empire were involved in the process 
and had a say with the Emperor, as well as the outside powers. 
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The Congress of Vienna (1814) dealt with the repercussions of Napoleon invading other 
countries and compromising their sovereignty. There were two actions that were not in alignment 
with and invaded the sovereignty of nations. One of these actions was when the Congress 
established the German Confederation. With respect to the German Confederation, it did well in 
that it protected the country. It was weak and did not appear as a threat to another country’s 
power, but it was just strong enough to hold itself together for a time. It collapsed when the 
competing interest between the two powers that ruled it caused it to collapse. The Confederation 
was subject to two outside powers, Austria and Prussia, which was a blatant compromise of its 
sovereignty.  
The second action was when the Congress also made Holland and Belgium one country, 
and Sweden and Norway one country. None of these governments wanted to be joined together 
nor did they last long together. The Congress did good and bad things, just like any other treaty. 
In some instances, like when resetting the boundaries, it did well. It did not succeed in building 
back up the compromised governments and establishing peace in Europe.  
The Treaty of Versailles did some things well, and some not at all. The League of 
Nations specifically had several flaws in its membership and structure. The Treaty also failed to 
establish peace in Europe and put a large burden on Germany specifically that it could not bear. 
Phillimore argued that treaties should not impose so much on a country that they can no longer 
endure.273 The Treaty of Versailles definitely did this to Germany. In general, the Treaty struck a 
compromise between the disputed territories having sovereign equality and being a spoil of war. 
Most of the time, when dealing with a valuable territory, the Treaty dictated that an Allied 
country would control it for a set amount of time. After that, the territory was to hold an election 
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to determine whether or not it wanted to continue under the Allied government or revert to 
German control. This is definitely evidence of the development of sovereign equality and it 
being invoked, but not to its full extent.  
Despite these flaws, the League of Nations was the world's first attempt at an 
international peace organization. This is undoubtedly an important step in world history. The 
first attempt of anything is bound to have flaws and the League is no exception. At the very least, 
it is the first time that countries across the world agreed to commit themselves to continually 
discuss world affairs. This in itself is a major step toward international cooperation. 
The United Nations Charter is, perhaps, the most obvious compromise between sovereign 
equality and the rule of power. While it was definitely a compromise between the two, this is not 
the first time that such a compromise was made. It is compromise that has consistently been 
made since the concept first came to be recognized. During the colonial period, there was an 
obvious compromise between sovereign equality and the ruling nations. Europe and other 
colonizing nations essentially said: everyone at the top is equal but everyone at the bottom is not 
equal to us. This transitioned into these powers become the "protectors" of these less powerful 
nations. The smaller nations spoke out against the powerful nations but have had limited success 
so far. The history of sovereign equality is showing how these nations are grappling with the 
concept of all governments being equal. Sovereign equality had become something that needed 
to be invoked in the international setting even if it was openly denied. 
All of these moments show an increasing acknowledgement and utilization of 
sovereignty. Its development has not been perfect, but it has gained prominence since the Peace 
of Westphalia and the Treaty of Utrecht.  
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We can acknowledge the Peace of Westphalia as the origin of this principle's 
development. It did not directly say that all governments and states were equal, but it laid the 
groundwork for sovereign equality and began the conversation about what this might look like. 
The Peace was not the "majestic portal"274 that Gross claimed and what happened next was not 
perfectly straight and linear. But Stirk was wrong to conclude that the Peace had nothing to do 
with sovereignty. The major flaw in his argument was that he did not look at religion as a factor 
or examine the affect that it had on politics before and after the Peace. We can see modern 
international law developing in the European states-system. It has "extended its sphere of 
operation," dealing more "with the fundamental facts in the relations of States."275 The 
international system has not remained stagnant. It has developed as new states have been added 
and included. It stands to reason that sovereign equality has had to have been adapted as the 
system changed as well.  
It does not appear that sovereign equality can be fully realized. It seems to be that the 
international system can get closer and closer to fully implementing it but will never fully do so. 
This concept is like infinity – we can get closer to it than we were, but we will never fully reach 
it.  
Opportunities for Future Research 
There are several topics that could be explored if the author had more time to spend on 
this project. Some of these topics are the shift from dynastic politics to constitutional 
governments, the relationship between sovereign equality and colonialism, what sovereign 
equality meant in the revolutionary era, and the relevance of sovereign equality in the wake of 
9/11. All of these topics might have been explored if the author had had time to explore them.  
                                                 
274 Gross, "The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948," 28. 
275 Edmunds, International Law and the Treaty of Peace, 4. 
80 
 
There was a gradual shift from dynastic politics to constitutional governments in Europe. 
The shift began with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. By establishing a new states system, the 
previous dynastic relationships gradually became less important. The shift was complete when 
the Ottoman Empire was ended after World War I. There were no more empires like there had 
been in the past. All of the governments within Europe had some kind of constitutional 
government and was a part of the international state-system.  
The relationship between colonialism and sovereign equality was a difficult, convoluted 
one. Colonialism is difficult to reconcile with the development of sovereign equality because it 
inherently detracts from the equality that is supposed to exist between nations. A colony suffers 
for the profit of the colonizing country. What brings sovereign equality into this is that the 
colony was under a previous government that the colonizer forcibly took over for profit. This act 
of taking over another government for the resources it controls is not justified by the law of 
nations.  
In the revolutionary era, the recognition of the sovereign equality of a new country meant 
that they had joined the states-system and gave their government validity. Colonies were 
revolting and fighting for independence. The revolutionary governments that were successful, or 
even those that were not, were hoping to be recognized as sovereign by another power. This 
would give them validity and empower them to join the international system of states. The 
American Declaration of Independence (1776) invoked this sentiment: "...to assume among the 
powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's 
God entitle them..."276 The Second Continental Congress was asking to be recognized in the 
international system just like other revolutionary governments at the time.  
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Another example of a revolutionary government seeking recognition in the international 
system was the Haitian Revolution. Saint Domingue was in open revolt as the slave population 
rebelled in 1791 and violently took over the French colony. When the new government was 
established in 1804, the United States recognized it as sovereign. This was important for the new 
government because it gave it validity and allowed it to enter into the international theatre. 
One of the effects of 9/11 is that it is considered justified to invade another state to 
protect a country's own sovereignty. The United States, specifically, began to engage in 
preventative wars after the attack.277 This meant going into a weak or failing states to protect US 
citizens (and the state's citizens) from future harm. A weak or failing state is a state that is unable 
to implement or enforce policy within its boundaries.278 These states are a humanitarian liability 
as well as a breeding ground for terrorism.279 A weak government undermines sovereign 
equality. "It does so because the problems that weak states generate for themselves and for others 
vastly increase the likelihood that someone else in the international system will seek to intervene 
in their affairs against their wishes to forcibly fix the problem."280 Because the problems in weak 
states seem to "leak" out of their borders, other powers tend to want to go in and make the 
government more stable.  
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